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Colorblind Context:  Redefining 
Race-Conscious Policies in Primary 
and Secondary Education 
he 2007 Supreme Court term began a new era of judicial 
conservatism that may eliminate or restrict federal 
prophylactic measures aimed at protecting the victims of 
discrimination and the disenfranchised.  On June 28, 2007, the 
Supreme Court addressed whether student body diversity was a 
compelling interest that justified the exclusive use of race to 
exclude children from attending the public schools of their 
choice.1  In Parents Involved in Community Schools v. School 
District No. 1, and its companion case Meredith v. Jefferson 
County Board of Education, the five-to-four majority, in a 
plurality opinion, answered in the negative and struck down 
voluntary practices and policies aimed at eliminating racial 
segregation and isolation in public primary and secondary 
schools.2 
The Court held that the exclusive use of race to make public 
school assignments violated the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.3  Although the Court voted to strike 
down the school assignment plans as unconstitutional, the case 
 
∗ Assistant Professor, Gonzaga University School of Law.  B.A., Willamette 
University; J.D., cum laude, Gonzaga University School of Law; Member of the 
Oregon and Washington State Bars, including the United States District Courts for 
Oregon and Washington and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. 
1 See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738, 
2746 (2007). 
2 See id. at 2768 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.). 
3 Id. (“The way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to stop 
discriminating on the basis of race.”). 
T
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revealed deep ideological differences among the Justices 
concerning the interpretation and application of federal law.  
Chief Justice Roberts, joined by Justices Alito, Scalia, and 
Thomas, held that the voluntary, race-conscious school plans 
were constitutionally flawed because race was outcome 
determinative in deciding which students could attend which 
schools.4 
Justice Kennedy agreed with the outcome; however, he 
refused to join Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion because he 
wanted to make it clear that public school officials could use race 
to achieve a diverse student body.5  In his concurring opinion, 
Justice Kennedy warned opponents that the Parents decision 
should not be read to foreclose the benign use of race to reduce 
or eliminate racial segregation or isolation in public primary and 
secondary schools.6  Instead, Justice Kennedy found that the 
school plans were constitutionally flawed because of the 
mechanical use of race to make the student assignments.7 
Justices Breyer, Stevens, Ginsburg, and Souter dissented.8  
Writing for the minority, Justice Breyer asserted that the school 
plans were narrowly tailored because public school officials were 
using race to reduce the effects of segregated housing patterns 
that cause racial isolation among public schoolchildren.9  Justice 
Breyer accused the Parents majority of failing to follow prior 
Supreme Court precedent that allowed public school officials to 
use race to achieve the benefits of an integrated learning 
environment.10  He contended that equal protection 
jurisprudence does not forbid the government from using race 
 
4 Id. 
5 Id. at 2789 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
6 See id. at 2799; see also Brewer v. W. Irondequoit Cent. Sch. Dist., 212 F.3d 738, 
752 (2d Cir. 2000) (finding that public school officials may exclude “some minority 
students from schools of their choice” to maintain an integrated student body 
(quoting Parent Ass’n of Andrew Jackson High Sch., v. Ambach 738 F.2d 574, 577 
(2d Cir. 1984)), superseded on other grounds by Zervos v. Verizon N.Y., Inc., 252 
F.3d 163 (2d Cir. 2001)); Parent Ass’n of Andrew Jackson High Sch. v. Ambach, 598 
F.2d 705, 717–21 (2d Cir. 1979) (holding that the state has a compelling interest in 
ensuring that schools are relatively integrated), appeal after remand, 738 F.2d 574 
(2d Cir. 1984). 
7 Parents, 127 S. Ct. at 2797 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
8 Id. at 2797 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 2800 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
9 Id. at 2800–06. 
10 Id. at 2800–01, 2836–37. 
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exclusively in the decision-making process; instead, it prohibits 
the government from using race as a tool for oppression, for 
segregation, or for providing access to limited governmental 
resources.11  He further stated that the majority had illogically 
denied public school officials of achieving interests that the 
majority recognized as compelling.12 
The Parents case reflects the thirty-year ascendancy of judicial 
conservatives to the Court.  During his confirmation hearing, 
Chief Justice Roberts described himself as “an umpire merely 
calling balls and strikes.”13  As evidenced by his opinion in 
Parents, however, the strike zone has become smaller and tighter 
when it comes to the voluntary use of race in the field of public 
education.14 
The current group of conservative Justices led by Chief Justice 
Roberts has reshaped the ability of public school officials to use 
race as a desegregation tool without overruling Grutter v. 
Bollinger, which permits universities to use “race to achieve 
student body diversity.”15  In Parents, Chief Justice Roberts held 
that Grutter did not apply to noncompetitive, race-conscious 
public school assignment plans because Grutter addressed 
whether student body diversity was a compelling state interest 
that can justify the use of race in “‘the context of higher 
education.’”16 
This Article examines the ideological differences among the 
current Court over the interpretation and application of federal 
law, and the effect these differences have on unsettling prior 
 
11 See id. at 2800, 2834–35. 
12 Id. at 2811, 2825. 
13 See Geoffrey R. Stone, A Narrow View of the Law, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 6, 2007, at 
C17 (describing Chief Justice Roberts’s understanding of how the Court should 
decide issues involving constitutional law).  See generally Hearing on Roberts 
Nomination Before the Senate Judiciary Committee, 109th Cong. 55 (2005) 
(statement of John G. Roberts, Jr., Nominee to be Chief Justice of the United 
States), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2005/09/12/politics/politicsspecial1/ 
12text-roberts.html (“Judges and justices are servants of the law, not the other way 
around.  Judges are like umpires.  Umpires don’t make the rules; they apply 
them.”). 
14 Cf. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 & n.13 (1954) (holding that “in the 
field of public education the doctrine of ‘separate but equal’ has no place” and 
requiring school districts to eliminate “existing segregated systems” based on the 
racial classification of public schoolchildren). 
15 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 334 (2003). 
16 Parents, 127 S. Ct. at 2754 (quoting Grutter, 539 U.S. at 328) (emphasis added). 
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Supreme Court precedent.  Part I reviews the precedent that led 
to the Court’s conclusion that race-conscious admissions policies 
in the context of higher education did not violate the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  Part II 
examines the circuit court cases that held the diversity-based 
benefits identified in the context of higher education justified the 
exclusive use of race to eliminate racial isolation and segregation 
in primary and secondary schools.  Part III contends that the 
ideological differences among the current Court created a four-
four-one split that still permits the flexible use of race to 
integrate public schools.  Part IV concludes that, in the 
aftermath of Parents, local governments can reduce racial 
isolation and segregation in public schools and avoid strict 
scrutiny by making school assignments based on socioeconomic 
status (“SES”) factors because SES assignment plans neither 
burden a fundamental right nor use racial classifications to 
determine whether children can attend the schools of their 
choice. 
I 
RACE-CONSCIOUS ADMISSIONS POLICIES IN THE CONTEXT OF 
HIGHER EDUCATION 
In Grutter v. Bollinger, the Supreme Court held that “student 
body diversity [was] a compelling state interest that . . . justif[ied] 
the use of race in university admissions.”17  In 2003, when the 
Court issued its opinion in Grutter, more than twenty-five years 
had passed since the Regents of the University of California v. 
Bakke decision in which the Supreme Court addressed whether 
the use of racial classifications in public education violated the 
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.18  The 
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment states 
that “[n]o State shall . . . deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”19  The Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment ensures that 
states and state entities will treat similarly situated people the 
same.20  Because the racial classification of individuals is 
 
17 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 325. 
18 See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 287–320 (1978). 
19 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2. 
20 See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976). 
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presumptively invalid, equal protection challenges alleging 
discrimination on the basis of race are subject to strict scrutiny.21  
Strict scrutiny requires the government to show a compelling 
interest that justifies the narrowly tailored use of race in the 
decision-making process.22 
In determining whether the race-conscious admissions policy 
violated federal law, the Bakke Court had to decide whether the 
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
guaranteed an applicant’s right to a color-blind admissions 
process, or whether a university could reserve a specific number 
of seats for minority applicants.23  In a plurality opinion, the 
Bakke Court held that the university’s race-conscious admissions 
policy violated federal law.24  Justice Stevens, along with Chief 
Justice Burger and Justices Rehnquist and Stewart, concluded 
that the university’s race conscious admissions policy violated 
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,25 which prohibits any 
program that receives federal funds from discriminating against 
any person on the basis of race, color, or national origin.26  
Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun concluded 
that a university may consider an applicant’s race as a factor in 
deciding whether to admit the applicant if “the use of race to 
achieve an integrated student body is necessitated by the 
lingering effects of past discrimination.”27 
In Bakke, Justice Powell concluded that the university’s 
minority set-aside program violated the Equal Protection Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment because the university was using 
racial classifications to provide preferential treatment to 
minority applicants.28  Justice Powell also concluded that a 
 
21 See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 326 (citing Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 
U.S. 200, 227 (1995)). 
22 Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 274 (1986). 
23 Cf. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 322 (“In the landmark Bakke case, [the Court] 
reviewed a racial set-aside program that reserved 16 out of 100 seats in a medical 
school class for members of certain minority groups.”). 
24 Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 271 (1978) (opinion of 
Powell, J.). 
25 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2006). 
26 Bakke, 438 U.S. at 421 (opinion of Stevens, J.). 
27 Id. at 326 n.1 (opinion of Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun, JJ.). 
28 Id. at 319–20 (opinion of Powell, J.) (explaining that the fatal flaw with the 
preferential program is that “it tells applicants who are not Negro, Asian, or 
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university’s race-conscious admissions policy would not violate 
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment if 
the admissions process did not insulate racial or ethnic 
minorities from “comparison with all other candidates for the 
available seats.”29 
A.  The Permissible Use of Race in Denying Applicants 
Admissions to the Public Universities of Their Choice 
The Bakke decision led to a division among the circuit courts 
over the scope and effect of the use of race-conscious measures 
to attain a diverse student body.30  Lower courts had difficulty 
identifying the effect and scope of the Bakke decision because 
six Justices wrote separate opinions concerning whether and 
when universities could consider an applicant’s race as part of 
the admissions process.31  In analyzing whether a university’s 
race-conscious admissions policy violated the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the circuit courts 
considered whether Bakke applied only if the university proved 
that it had denied applicants admission to the university based 
on their race, or whether Bakke permitted the narrowly tailored 
use of race absent proof that race was being used to remedy 
state-sanctioned discrimination.32 
The Fifth Circuit believed that Bakke and subsequent cases 
addressing the use of race and affirmative action permitted the 
government to use race only if the policy remedied past, 
 
Chicano that they are totally excluded from a specific percentage of the seats in an 
entering class”). 
29 Id. at 317 (explaining that the an admissions program that considers race a plus 
factor ensures that the university considers “the particular qualifications of each 
applicant, and . . . place[s] them on the same footing for consideration, although not 
necessarily according [each applicant’s qualifications] the same weight”). 
30 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 322 (2003); see also Adarand Constructors, 
Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 221 (1995) (“The Court’s failure to produce a majority 
opinion in Bakke . . . [and its subsequent affirmative action cases has] left 
unresolved the proper analysis for remedial race-based government action.”). 
31 See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 322. 
32 Compare United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 167 (1987) (explaining that 
the government may use racial classifications to remedy past and present state-
sanctioned discrimination), with Bakke, 438 U.S. at 326 n.1 (opinion of Brennan, 
White, Marshall, and Blackmun, JJ.) (limiting the use of racial classifications to 
remedy “the lingering effects of past discrimination”). 
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intentional discriminatory practices.33  In contrast, the Sixth and 
Ninth Circuits believed that Bakke allowed public universities to 
treat applicants differently because of race to attain the benefits 
of a diverse student body.34 
Relying on the fact that Justice Powell was the only Justice in 
Bakke who found that student body diversity was a compelling 
state interest, the Fifth Circuit rejected the argument that Bakke 
was binding precedent permitting the nonremedial use of race to 
achieve student body diversity.35  For example, in Hopwood v. 
Texas, the Fifth Circuit addressed whether the University of 
Texas Law School violated the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment when it considered an applicant’s race 
in deciding whom it would admit into the law school program.36 
In Hopwood, several nonminority applicants sued the 
University of Texas Law School for discrimination and asked the 
district court to enjoin the law school from considering an 
applicant’s race in the admissions process.37  The Fifth Circuit 
held that the law school could “‘not use race as a factor in 
deciding which applicants to admit’” because there was 
insufficient evidence to support a finding of intentional 
discrimination on the part of the law school.38 
Consistent with Supreme Court precedent holding that “the 
government cannot use racial preferences to remedy general and 
societal discrimination,”39 the Fifth Circuit prohibited the 
University of Texas Law School from considering race in the 
admissions process “‘to combat the perceived effects of a hostile 
 
33 See, e.g., Hopwood v. Texas (Hopwood II), 78 F.3d 932, 948–49 (5th Cir. 1996), 
cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1033 (1996). 
34 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 321; Smith v. Univ. of Wash. Law Sch., 233 F.3d 1188, 
1199–1201 (9th Cir. 2000), aff’d, 392 F.3d 367 (2004). 
35 Hopwood v. Texas (Hopwood III), 236 F.3d 256, 275 n.66 (5th Cir. 2000) 
(disagreeing with the Ninth Circuit’s holding that “Justice Powell’s diversity 
rationale [was] binding Supreme Court precedent”); see also Wygant v. Jackson Bd. 
of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 286 (1986) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“[A]lthough its 
precise contours are uncertain, a state interest in the promotion of racial diversity 
has been found sufficiently ‘compelling,’ at least in the context of higher education, 
to support the use of racial considerations in furthering that interest.” (citing Bakke, 
438 U.S. at 311–315)). 
36 Hopwood II, 78 F.3d at 934. 
37 Hopwood III, 236 F.3d at 261. 
38 Id. at 273 (quoting Hopwood II, 78 F.3d at 962). 
39 Id. (citing Wygant, 476 U.S. 267). 
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environment at the law school, . . . to alleviate the law school’s 
poor reputation in the minority community, or . . . to eliminate 
any present effects of past discrimination by actors other than 
the law school.’”40 
In Hopwood, the Fifth Circuit found that the law school’s 
race-conscious admissions process was inconsistent with “the 
central purpose of the Equal Protection Clause,” which is to 
prevent states and state entities from “‘discriminating [against 
individuals] on the basis of race.’”41  Thus, the Fifth Circuit 
reasoned that using race to determine who would be admitted to 
the law school was contrary to the policies underlying the Equal 
Protection Clause because it made race relevant in the decision-
making process.42 
Conversely, in Grutter v. Bollinger, the Sixth Circuit refused 
to follow the Fifth Circuit’s reasoning and held that Bakke 
permitted the narrowly tailored use of race to achieve student 
body diversity, even though the university was not attempting to 
eliminate the present effects of past discrimination.43  In Grutter, 
the plaintiff, a white female applicant, sued the University of 
Michigan Law School alleging that the law school violated the 
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because 
it considered race in deciding which applicants to admit into the 
program.44 
The Sixth Circuit reversed the district court’s judgment in 
favor of the plaintiff holding that student body diversity was a 
compelling interest, and that the policies and practices of the law 
school were narrowly tailored to achieve the institutionally 
asserted interest.45  The Sixth Circuit found that the law school’s 
policies and practices did not violate Bakke because the use of 
“[r]ace and ethnicity, along with a range of other factors, are 
potential ‘plus’ factors in a particular applicant’s file, but they do 
not insulate an under-represented minority applicant from 
competition or act to foreclose competition from non-minority 
 
40 Id. (quoting Hopwood II, 78 F.3d at 962). 
41 Hopwood II, 78 F.3d at 939 (quoting Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 642 (1993)); 
see also Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976). 
42 See Hopwood II, 78 F.3d at 940–48. 
43 See Grutter v. Bollinger, 288 F.3d 732, 752 (6th Cir. 2002), aff’d, 539 U.S. 306 
(2003). 
44 Id. at 735. 
45 See id. at 743, 749–50. 
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applicants.”46  In Grutter, the Sixth Circuit reasoned that the law 
school’s admissions process ensured that it weighed fairly and 
competitively each applicant’s qualifications.47 
Unlike the Fifth Circuit, the Sixth Circuit reasoned that 
Justice Powell’s opinion in Bakke was binding precedent because 
it was the narrowest rationale for supporting the judgment that 
the university’s race-conscious admissions policy violated the 
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.48  
Likewise, the Ninth Circuit found that Bakke was binding 
precedent allowing public universities to consider race in 
selecting applicants so long as minority applicants were not 
immune from competing with nonminority applicants for 
admission to the University of Washington Law School.49 
In Grutter, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve 
the split among the circuits over the use of racial classifications 
in the context of higher education.50  The Grutter Court affirmed 
the Sixth Circuit’s holding that neither the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment nor the Court’s post-
Bakke cases on state-sanctioned, raced-based affirmative action 
prevented public universities from considering race in the 
admissions process.51  Applying strict scrutiny, the Supreme 
Court reviewed the University of Michigan Law School’s race-
conscious admissions plan to “examin[e] the importance and the 
sincerity of the reasons advanced by [the law school] for the use 
of race” in the context of higher education.52 
Acknowledging that the use of racial classifications in the 
decision-making process raises special fears that they are 
motivated by an invidious purpose, the Court applies strict 
scrutiny whenever the plaintiff alleges discrimination based on 
 
46 Id. at 746. 
47 See id. at 746–47. 
48 Id. at 739–41; see also Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 325–
26 (1978) (opinion of Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmum, JJ.) (“Mr. Justice 
Powell agrees that some uses of race in university admissions are permissible and, 
therefore, he joins us to make five votes reversing the judgment below insofar as it 
prohibits the University from establishing race-conscious programs in the future.”). 
49 See Smith v. Univ. of Wash., 233 F.3d 1188, 1199–1201 (9th Cir. 2000). 
50 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 322 (2003). 
51 See id. at 343–44. 
52 Id. at 327. 
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race.53  Despite this heightened standard of review for cases 
involving racial classifications, the Grutter Court recognized that 
context matters when deciding whether the specific use of racial 
classifications are unconstitutional.54  The Grutter Court stated 
that “[a]lthough all governmental uses of race are subject to 
strict scrutiny, not all [uses] are invalidated by it.”55 
In Grutter, the Supreme Court identified three compelling 
interests that justified the narrowly tailored use of race in the 
context of higher education:  “break[ing] down racial 
stereotypes”;56 preparing students to work in “‘an increasingly 
diverse workforce and society’”;57 and providing the “training 
ground for a large number of [the] Nation’s leaders.”58 
The Court found that University of Michigan Law School’s 
admissions process was narrowly tailored to achieve those 
interests because the admissions process allowed the University 
of Michigan Law School to meet its stated goal of creating a 
student body that was able to make unique contributions to the 
law school environment, the University of Michigan Law School 
did not have a quota system or insulate applicants solely on the 
basis of race, and the admissions process did not unduly burden 
nonminority applicants.59 
In contrast, in Gratz v. Bollinger, the companion case to 
Grutter, the Supreme Court held that the University of 
 
53 Id. at 326 (“‘Absent searching judicial inquiry into the justification for such 
race-based measures,’ [the Court] has no way to determine what ‘classifications are 
“benign” or “remedial” and what classifications are in fact motivated by illegitimate 
notions of racial inferiority or simple racial politics.’” (quoting City of Richmond v. 
J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989))); see also Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 
499, 505–06 (2005) (explaining that the use of racial classifications “raise[s] special 
fears that they are motivated by an invidious purpose”). 
54 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 327 (explaining that the purpose of the judicial inquiry is 
“carefully examining the importance and the sincerity of the reasons advanced by 
the governmental decisionmaker for the use of race in a particular context”). 
55 Id. 326–27. 
56 Id. at 330. 
57 Id. (quoting Brief of the American Educational Research Ass’n et al. as Amici 
Curiae in Support of Respondents, Grutter, 539 U.S. 306 (No. 02-241), 2003 WL 
398292). 
58 Id. 
59 Id. at 341; see also Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 274–75 (2003) (invalidating 
the undergraduate school’s race-conscious admissions plan because the bonus 
points for the applicant’s race meant that nonminority applicants were unduly 
harmed). 
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Michigan’s undergraduate race-conscious admissions policy 
violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment because of the mechanical use of race in 
determining which applicants to admit.60  In Gratz, the Supreme 
Court addressed the same issue that was presented in Grutter:  
whether student body diversity justified the narrowly tailored 
use of race in the admissions process.61  But, under the Gratz 
system, every applicant automatically received an additional 
twenty points if the applicant was from an underrepresented 
minority group.62 
The additional points ensured that the university admitted 
every minority applicant so long as the applicant met the 
minimum requirements for admission.63  This system made race 
a decisive factor rather than a “plus factor,” which means that 
the student’s race or ethnicity is one factor among many in 
deciding which applicants should be admitted to the university.64  
The Court held that the Gratz system was unconstitutional 
because it “automatically distribute[d] 20 points, or one-fifth of 
the points needed to guarantee admission, to every single 
‘underrepresented minority’ applicant solely because of race.”65 
As applied, the Gratz admissions process violated the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because the 
admissions process ignored the applicant’s individual 
characteristics.66  Instead, the Gratz admissions process focused 
exclusively on the applicant’s race or ethnicity.67  Thus, the Gratz 
admissions process unduly harmed nonminority applicants 
because race was outcome determinative in deciding whether a 
particular applicant would be admitted to the university.68 
In both Grutter and Gratz, the Supreme Court held that it 
would defer to the university’s “educational judgment that 
 
60 See Gratz, 539 U.S. at 274–76. 
61 See id. at 270. 
62 Id. at 255. 
63 Id. at 273. 
64 Id. at 271–72. 
65 Id. at 270. 
66 Cf. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 315–16 (2003) (explaining that the law 
school’s admissions policy allowed for individual review of each applicant’s 
qualifications instead of relying on the applicant’s race). 
67 Gratz, 539 U.S. at 255. 
68 Id. at 272. 
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diversity is essential to its educational mission.”69  The Court 
reserved judicial scrutiny to determine whether the university’s 
admission policy was narrowly tailored to achieve the 
university’s educational mission.70 
Under Grutter and Gratz, universities must now satisfy the 
following five narrowly tailored factors.  First, they must show 
that their admissions process does not use quotas to fill a specific 
number of seats.71  Second, universities must show that they 
engage in an individualized, holistic review that compares the 
entire pool of applicants with each other.72  Third, universities 
must demonstrate that the admissions process does not “unduly 
harm members of any racial group.”73  Fourth, universities must 
show that they considered other workable race-neutral 
alternatives before adopting a race-conscious admissions 
policy.74  Finally, universities must demonstrate that they 
periodically review the admissions process to determine whether 
the use of race is still required to achieve a diverse student 
body.75 
In reaching its conclusion that an admissions process that 
satisfies the five factors is constitutionally permissible, the 
Grutter majority rejected assertions that Supreme Court 
precedent prohibited the nonremedial use of race.76  The Grutter 
Court endorsed Justice Powell’s view in Bakke that “student 
body diversity is a compelling state interest that can justify the 
use of race in university admissions.”77 
 
69 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 328. 
70 See id. at 333. 
71 See id. at 335–36. 
72 See id. at 337. 
73 See id. at 341. 
74 See id. at 339. 
75 See id. at 342–43. 
76 See id. at 328 (stating that neither Bakke nor Supreme Court cases decided 
after Bakke support the proposition that “remedying past discrimination is the only 
permissible justification for race-based governmental action”); see also Wygant v. 
Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 286 (1986) (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
77 See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 325. 
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B.  Following the Principles of Stare Decisis, Justice O’Connor 
Validates the Use of Race in the Context of Higher Education 
Disappointing conservatives who hoped that the Court would 
abolish all state-sanctioned, race-based affirmative action 
programs, Justice O’Connor, in her Grutter opinion, stated that 
Bakke only prohibited the exclusive use of race to achieve 
student body diversity.78  In Grutter, Justice O’Connor invoked 
the principles of stare decisis to determine whether the Court’s 
post-Bakke affirmative action cases prohibited the nonremedial 
use of race in the context of higher education.79 
Under the doctrine of stare decisis, the Court is required to 
follow earlier judicial results except in the rare instances in 
which the rule of law is outdated, unduly burdens affected 
litigants, or “‘a fragmented Court decides a case and no single 
rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of five 
[concurring] Justices.’”80  The policy underlying the doctrine is 
threefold:  first, it ensures judicial efficiency; second, it ensures 
judicial consistency; and finally, it ensures judicial integrity.81  
The Court, however, may find that the facts of the prior cases 
are not analogous to the current situation, which allows the 
Court to reach a different result in the present case without 
overruling the prior case.82  Thus, the Court may refuse to follow 
its prior precedent if the Court concludes that it is legally or 
factually inapposite.83 
Before deciding whether student body diversity was a 
compelling state interest, Justice O’Connor had to determine 
whether the post-Bakke Supreme Court cases prohibited 
nonremedial, race-based affirmative action programs.84  In her 
 
78 See id. at 328 (“We first wish to dispel the notion that the Law School’s 
argument [that public institutions may consider race in the decision-making process] 
has been foreclosed, either expressly or implicitly, by [the Court’s] affirmative-
action cases decided since Bakke.”); see also Wygant, 476 U.S. at 267, 286 
(O’Connor, J., concurring) (citing Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 
265, 311–315 (1978) (opinion of Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun, JJ.)). 
79 See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 326. 
80 Id. at 325 (quoting Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977)). 
81 See 2A FEDERAL PROCEDURE LAWYERS EDITION:  APPEAL, CERTIORARI, 
AND REVIEW § 3:790 (2003). 
82 See id. 
83 See id. 
84 Compare Wygant v. Jackson Bd. Of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 283–84 (1986) 
(holding that the use of race in selecting which public school teachers to terminate 
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Grutter opinion, Justice O’Connor used a two-step test in 
deciding whether post-Bakke affirmative action cases prohibited 
public universities from considering an applicant’s race as part of 
the admissions process:  first, Justice O’Connor examined 
whether universities had relied on Justice Powell’s diversity 
analysis in Bakke to design and implement race-conscious 
admissions policies; and, second, whether prohibiting 
universities who had come to rely on Justice Powell’s analysis in 
Bakke would cause undue hardship on the ability of those 
universities to attain the benefits of an integrated student body.85 
In reaching her conclusion in Grutter that public universities 
may consider an applicant’s race as part of the admissions 
process, Justice O’Connor recognized that “public and private 
universities across the Nation [had] modeled their own 
admissions programs on Justice Powell’s views on permissible 
race-conscious policies.”86  She further recognized that the Court 
would undermine institutional efforts “‘to select those students 
who [would] contribute the most to the “robust exchange of 
ideas”’” if the Court eliminated the consideration of race from 
the admissions process.87 
Justice O’Connor’s analysis in Grutter used the principles of 
stare decisis to promote judicial integrity and social cohesion.  
As evidenced by her analysis in Grutter, Justice O’Connor 
refused to resort to arbitrary rulemaking to achieve a particular 
judicial or political agenda.  She sought to preserve judicial 
integrity and stability, including society’s ability to rely on the 
Court’s prior cases in making daily decisions and understanding 
the constitutional effects of those decisions.88 
 
to remedy prior general and societal discrimination against minority public school 
teachers violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment), with 
City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 504 (1989) (requiring the 
government to present evidence showing institutional discrimination rather than 
general, societal discrimination to survive strict scrutiny). 
85 See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 323, 333 (relying on the diversity rationale underlying 
Justice Powell’s opinion in Bakke because of its social and judicial impact). 
86 Id. at 323. 
87 Id. at 324 (quoting Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 313 
(1978) (opinion of Powell, J.)). 
88 See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854, 856 (1992) 
(voting to affirm Roe v. Wade because the Court has an “obligation to follow [its] 
precedent” and to acknowledge the fact that individuals and institutions have 
“organized intimate relationships and made choices that define their views . . . and 
their places in society, in reliance on” the Court’s prior cases). 
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II 
THE JUDICIAL RESPONSE TO GRUTTER AND THE BENIGN USE 
OF RACE IN THE CONTEXT OF PRIMARY AND SECONDARY 
EDUCATION 
The Supreme Court’s holding in Grutter that student body 
diversity is a compelling interest was long overdue.  In 1954, 
Brown v. Board of Education ended more than 100 years of 
state-sanctioned racial segregation in public education.89  The 
Grutter holding is consistent with Brown’s mandate that requires 
the elimination of racial segregation in the field of public 
education.  Underlying this mandate was the recognition that 
racial segregation and isolation “generates a feeling of inferiority 
. . . that may affect [the] hearts and minds [of black 
schoolchildren] in a way unlikely to ever be undone.”90 
Yet, in the fifty-three years since that decision, eliminating 
racial segregation in public schools has been both problematic 
and divisive.  Many Americans began to believe that affirmative 
action meant preferential treatment for racial and ethnic 
minorities who were less qualified than their white counterparts.  
This public perception was reflected in the post-Bakke race-
based affirmative action decisions that prohibited the 
nonremedial use of racial classifications.91  Following the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Grutter, the circuit courts were 
internally divided over Grutter’s effect on the nonremedial use 
of race to integrate primary and secondary schools.92  At issue 
was whether Grutter’s diversity benefits applied to primary and 
secondary education and, if Grutter did apply, whether Grutter 
prohibited the exclusive use of race to integrate primary and 
secondary schools.93 
 
89 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954). 
90 Id. at 494. 
91 E.g. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989) (explaining 
that the nonremedial use of race “promote[s] notions of racial inferiority and lead[s] 
to . . . racial hostility”). 
92 See, e.g., Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 137 F. Supp. 
2d 1224 (W.D. Wash. 2001), rev’d, 377 F.3d 949 (9th Cir. 2004), rev’d en banc, 426 
F.3d 1162 (9th Cir. 2005), rev’d, 127 S. Ct. 2738 (2007). 
93 See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 426 F.3d 1162, 
1179 (9th Cir. 2005), rev’d, 127 S. Ct. 2738 (2007); Comfort v. Lynn Sch. Comm., 418 
F.3d 1, 16 (1st Cir. 2005); McFarland ex rel. McFarland v. Jefferson County Pub. 
Sch., 330 F. Supp. 2d 834, 855 (W.D. Ky. 2004), aff’d per curiam, 416 F.3d 513 (6th 
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Public school officials had little difficulty in meeting the 
“compelling interest” prong needed to satisfy strict scrutiny.94  
Judges recognized that the benefits of student body diversity in 
primary and secondary schools were the same as the recognized 
benefits in the university setting:  “[D]isarming racial 
stereotypes, increasing racial tolerance, and preparing students 
to live and work in an increasingly multi-racial society.”95  But 
dissenting judges found that the exclusive use of race in the 
context of primary and secondary schools to achieve those 
benefits violated the Constitution’s prohibition against 
classifying individuals, including children, based on their race.96  
Consequently, public school officials could not satisfy strict 
scrutiny’s narrowly tailored prong because race was outcome 
determinative.97 
The First, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits held that public school 
officials had a compelling interest in meeting Brown’s mandate 
that the state make public education “available to all on equal 
terms.”98  Consistent with Brown’s conclusion that “education is 
 
Cir. 2005), rev’d sub nom., Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 
1, 127 S. Ct. 2738 (2007). 
94 See Parents, 426 F.3d at 1179; Comfort, 418 F.3d at 16; McFarland, 330 F. Supp. 
2d at 855. 
95 Comfort, 418 F.3d at 14; see also Parents, 426 F.3d at 1196 (Bea, J., dissenting) 
(acknowledging that children gain civic and educational skills in attending 
integrated schools); Comfort, 418 F.3d at 32 (Selya, J., dissenting) (conceding that 
the school plan was “well-intentioned and that it has helped promote greater 
diversity” in the district’s public schools). 
96 Parents, 426 F.3d at 1200–01 (Bea, J., dissenting) (stating that the exclusive use 
of race to promote racial diversity violates the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment); Comfort, 418 F.3d at 30–31 (Selya, J., dissenting) (stating 
that the “bestowal of any benefit [based on racial classifications] counteracts the 
ultimate goal of relegating racial distinctions to irrelevance”); Tuttle v. Arlington 
County Sch. Bd., 195 F.3d 698, 706 (4th Cir. 1999) (finding that the school 
assignment plan was not narrowly tailored because it was “not tied to identified past 
[discriminatory conduct on the part of the school district]”); McFarland, 330 F. 
Supp. 2d at 864 (finding that automatically placing black and white students on 
separate assignment tracks was not narrowly tailored because public school officials 
did not engage in an holistic review of each applicant). 
97 Compare Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 340 (2003) (finding that the law 
school’s admission plan was narrowly tailored to meet its goal of obtaining “the 
educational benefits of diversity” because it reviewed each applicant’s file), with 
McFarland, 330 F. Supp. 2d at 864 (finding that automatically placing black and 
white students on separate assignment tracks was not narrowly tailored because 
public school officials did not engage in an holistic review of each applicant). 
98 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954); accord Comfort, 418 F.3d at 
16; McFarland, 330 F. Supp. 2d at 855. 
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perhaps the most important function of state and local 
governments,”99 the First, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits held that 
public school officials had a compelling state interest in 
maintaining a racially diverse student body that prepares 
children for living and working in an increasingly diverse 
workforce and society.100 
Distinguishing Grutter, the First and Ninth Circuits held that 
individualized, holistic review was inapplicable and unnecessary 
in the context of primary and secondary education because 
students do not suffer the same risks associated with being 
denied placement at an elite university.101  Unlike the First and 
Ninth Circuits, however, the Sixth Circuit held that public school 
plans that rely solely on racial classifications to make student 
assignments violated Grutter’s narrowly tailored requirements. 
A.  First Circuit:  Race-Based Assignment Plans Are 
Constitutionally Permissible 
Despite the constraints of Grutter and Gratz, in Comfort v. 
Lynn School Committee, the First Circuit concluded that a public 
school transfer plan that relied solely on race to make 
assignments survived strict scrutiny.102  In that case, the First 
Circuit addressed whether the school district’s voluntary 
desegregation plan violated, among other laws, the Equal 
 
99 Brown, 347 U.S. at 493. 
100 Parents, 426 F.3d at 1175 (finding that public schools have an important role in 
preparing schoolchildren in meeting their democratic and civic responsibilities); 
Comfort, 418 F.3d at 15–16 (finding that there was “significant evidence in the 
record [to support the conclusion that] the benefits of a racially diverse school are 
more compelling at younger ages”); McFarland, 330 F. Supp. 2d at 853 (“[T]he 
benefits of racial tolerance and understanding are equally ‘important and laudable’ 
in public elementary and secondary education as in higher education.”). 
101 Parents, 426 F.3d at 1181 (concluding that the dangers present in the 
university context of using race as a proxy for merit are not present in the 
noncompetitive K–12 environment); Comfort, 418 F.3d at 19 (finding that 
“individualized consideration of each student is unnecessary under a 
noncompetitive, voluntary student transfer plan”); Brewer v. W. Irondequoit Cent. 
Sch. Dist., 212 F.3d 738, 752 (2d Cir. 2000) (explaining that the school district 
offered students who were not permitted to attend the school of their choice “an 
equivalent alternative education” at their assigned school). 
102 Comfort, 418 F.3d at 16, 19–23 (explaining that narrow tailoring requires 
consideration of the following narrowly tailored factors:  (i) whether the relief is 
necessary; (ii) whether the relief is in proportion to the problem; and (iii) whether 
the relief unduly harms the rights of third parties) (citing United States v. Paradise, 
480 U.S. 149, 171 (1987)). 
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Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment when public 
school officials used race alone to determine student eligibility 
for transferring to a school that was not in the student’s 
neighborhood.103  The district court held that the plan was 
constitutional because student body diversity is a compelling 
interest, and the plan was narrowly tailored to achieve that 
interest.104 
A First Circuit panel reversed, holding that the “[p]lan [was] 
not narrowly tailored . . . because it use[d] race ‘mechanically’ 
and [forewent] ‘individualized consideration of transfer 
applications.’”105  Additionally, the panel found that the plan was 
overly broad and indefinite in duration.106  The First Circuit 
granted an en banc hearing, and a divided court affirmed the 
judgment of the district court.107  The First Circuit held that the 
exclusive use of race to reduce racial isolation in the 
noncompetitive academic environment of K–12 did not violate 
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
because the plan “did not seek racial balancing for its own 
sake.”108  Instead, the transfer plan used race to “(i) reap the 
educational benefits that flow from a racially diverse student 
body . . . and (ii) avoid the negative educational consequences 
that accompany racial isolation.”109 
In deciding that the diversity benefits identified in Grutter 
applied to primary and secondary education, the First Circuit 
rejected the contention that the benefits that flow from student 
body diversity in the context of higher education did not extend 
to “the benefits that flow from racial diversity in the K–12 
context.”110  It reasoned that there was a “strong familial 
resemblance” between viewpoint diversity in the university 
 
103 Id. at 6–8. 
104 Id. at 9–10. 
105 Id. at 10 (quoting Comfort v. Lynn Sch. Comm., No. 03-2415, Slip Op. at 40 
(1st Cir. Oct. 20, 2004), opinion withdrawn on grant of reh’g by 2004 WL 2348505 
(1st Cir. Nov. 24, 2004), en banc reh’g, 418 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2005)). 
106 Id. (“The panel also cited other narrow tailoring flaws, including the Plan’s 
breadth and indefinite duration.”). 
107 Id. at 6. 
108 Id. at 21. 
109 Id. at 14. 
110 Id. at 15. 
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setting and racial diversity in the K–12 setting.111  The First 
Circuit identified three common factors supporting the 
conclusion that the diversity benefits identified in Grutter 
applied to primary and secondary education:  “[B]reaking down 
racial barriers, promoting cross-racial understanding, and 
preparing students for a world in which ‘race unfortunately still 
matters.’”112 
The First Circuit relied on the factors that the Supreme Court 
used in United States v. Paradise rather than on the Grutter 
factors to determine whether the school district’s plan was 
narrowly tailored.113  Although the the court believed that 
Grutter “provide[d] some guidance for [its] narrow tailoring 
inquiry,”114 it held that the Grutter narrowly tailored 
requirements were distinguishable because refusing a student’s 
request to transfer to a particular school was significantly 
different than denying an applicant “a spot at a unique or 
selective educational institution.”115 
Under Paradise, courts are required to consider the following 
factors in determining whether the policy or plan is narrowly 
tailored to meet the compelling state interest:  first, whether the 
plan or policy is necessary to achieve the interest; second, 
whether the numerical goals are based on the racial 
demographics of “the relevant labor market”; and third, whether 
the plan unduly burdens the rights of third parties.116  Relying on 
the Paradise factors, the First Circuit found that the school 
district’s plan was narrowly tailored because the evidence 
showed “a causal link [existed] between improvements in the 
school system and increased racial diversity”;117 the racial 
composition of the schools reflected the racial composition of 
the city’s population; and the schools within the district provided 
“a comparable education.”118 
 
111 Id. 
112 Id. at 16 (quoting Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 333 (2003)). 
113 Id. (citing United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 171 (1987)). 
114 Id. at 17. 
115 Id. at 20. 
116 Paradise, 480 U.S. at 171. 
117 Comfort, 418 F.3d at 15. 
118 Id. at 20; see also Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 
25 (1971) (explaining that public school officials have authority to adopt policies 
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B.  Sixth Circuit:  The Exclusive Use of Race to Determine Which 
Children Can Attend Which Schools Violates the Equal 
Protection Clause 
Affirming the judgment of the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Kentucky, the Sixth Circuit held that 
racial diversity in the context of primary and secondary public 
education was a compelling interest.119  In McFarland, the 
district court addressed whether the county’s student assignment 
plan was narrowly tailored when the county used race in making 
nontraditional and traditional school assignments.120  The court 
held that the county met its burden of showing that maintaining 
a fully integrated school system was a compelling interest; 
however, the district court’s application of the Grutter narrow 
tailoring criteria allowed the county to use race to meet its 
mission in making nontraditional school assignments and 
deprived the county of using race in making traditional school 
assignments.121 
In holding that the process used to make nontraditional 
school assignments was narrowly tailored, the court found that 
students were not “insulated from competition with all other 
students and no student [was] placed on a separate [assignment] 
track” because of the student’s race.122  The district court 
rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that the county’s use of race in 
making nontraditional school assignments operated as a racial 
quota.123  Applying Grutter and Gratz, the court reasoned that 
the county could use race to achieve the desired racial mix so 
long as it did not reserve a fixed number or proportion of 
educational opportunities exclusively for racial and ethnic 
minorities.124 
The district court found that the county considered several 
factors, such as residency, student choice, lottery assignments, 
 
that ensure each school’s population reflects the racial composition of the school 
district as a whole). 
119 McFarland ex rel. McFarland v. Jefferson County Pub. Sch., 330 F. Supp. 2d 
834 (W.D. Ky. 2004), aff’d per curiam, 416 F.3d 513 (6th Cir. 2005), rev’d sub nom., 
Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738 (2007). 
120 See id. at 837. 
121 Id. at 858–59, 864. 
122 Id. at 858. 
123 Id. 
124 See id. at 856–58. 
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and racial guidelines, in making nontraditional school 
assignments.125  On the other hand, the court held that the 
county’s use of race to make traditional school assignments was 
not narrowly tailored. 126  Unlike the assignments to the 
nontraditional schools, the court found that the traditional 
assignment process placed white and nonwhite applicants on 
separate assignment tracks, and the county did not engage in the 
holistic review required under Grutter.127 
C.  Ninth Circuit:  Public School Officials May Use Race to 
Combat the Harmful Effects of Segregated Housing Patterns 
The Ninth Circuit’s decision in Parents underscores the 
problems and divisiveness that arise in desegregation cases and 
the application of the Grutter criteria in the context of primary 
and secondary education.128  In Parents, the plaintiffs and the 
school district filed cross-motions for summary judgment based 
on the fact that the school district was using a racial tiebreaker to 
determine who was entitled to attend an oversubscribed high 
school.129  The district court granted summary judgment in favor 
of the school district, and a Ninth Circuit panel reversed.130  The 
panel majority held that the racial tiebreaker violated the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because the 
tiebreaker was analogous to a quota system.131  In reaching its 
holding, the panel majority stated that the “School District’s 
racial tiebreaker fail[ed] virtually every one of the [Grutter] 
narrow tailoring requirements.”132  With respect to the school 
district’s use of race to make public school assignments, the 
panel majority stated that Gratz specifically prohibited the 
 
125 Id. at 858. 
126 Id. at 862. 
127 See id. at 862–64 (rejecting the County’s argument that the “separate racial 
lists [were] necessary to maintain solid levels of black student participation in 
traditional schools”). 
128 Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 426 F.3d 1162 (9th 
Cir. 2005) (en banc), rev’d, 127 S. Ct. 2738 (2007). 
129 Id. at 1171. 
130 See id. at 1172. 
131 Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 377 F.3d 949, 969–
70 (9th Cir. 2004), rev’d en banc, 426 F.3d 1162 (9th Cir. 2005), rev’d, 127 S. Ct. 2738 
(2007). 
132 Id. at 969. 
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school district’s tiebreaker because it classified “hundreds of 
white and non-white applicants [based] solely . . . [on] their 
race.”133 
Like the First Circuit, an en banc hearing was granted and a 
divided Ninth Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district 
court.134  In Parents, a majority of the Ninth Circuit judges 
agreed with Judge Graber, the dissenting panel judge, that racial 
diversity in the context of public primary and secondary 
education is a compelling interest because it affects younger and 
more impressionable students “‘before they are locked into 
racialized thinking.’”135  Relying on prior Supreme Court 
precedent that encourages public school desegregation efforts, 
the Ninth Circuit reasoned that public school officials could 
voluntarily seek to eliminate the harmful consequences caused 
by de facto segregation.136 
Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit contended that the Supreme 
Court had acknowledged that there was no constitutional 
prohibition preventing public school officials from using 
integration to achieve a diverse academic environment.137  The 
purpose of voluntary integration is “to ensure that patterns of 
residential segregation are not repeated as patterns of 
 
133 Id. at 969–70 (stating that Gratz prohibited race-conscious measures that 
guaranteed one-fifth of the necessary points for admission “to every single 
‘underrepresented minority’ applicant solely because of race” (quoting Gratz v. 
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 270 (2003)) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
134 Parents, 426 F.3d at 1172. 
135 Id. at 1176 (quoting Comfort ex rel. Neumyer v. Lynn Sch. Comm., 283 F. 
Supp. 2d 328, 356 (D. Mass. 2003), aff’d sub nom., 418 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2005)).  
Compare id. at 1175 (finding that public schools have an important role in preparing 
schoolchildren in meeting their democratic and civic responsibilities), with Comfort 
v. Lynn Sch. Comm., 418 F.3d 1, 15–16 (1st Cir. 2005) (finding that there was 
“significant evidence in the record [to support the conclusion] that the benefits of a 
racially diverse school are more compelling at younger ages”). 
136 Parents, 426 F.3d at 1179 (citing Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of 
Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 16 (1971); N.C. State Bd. of Educ. v. Swann, 402 U.S. 43, 45 
(1971); Bustop, Inc. v. Bd. of Educ. of L.A., 439 U.S. 1380, 1383 (1978); Keyes v. 
Sch. Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 242 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part); Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457, 480 (1982)). 
137 Parents, 426 F.3d at 1173 (“‘School boards . . . [are] free to develop and 
initiate further plans to promote school desegregation . . . . Nothing in this opinion 
[requiring parties to show that the government was a passive participant in a public 
system of racial discrimination] is meant to discourage school boards from 
exceeding minimal constitutional standards in promoting the values of an integrated 
school experience.’”  (quoting Keyes, 413 U.S. at 242 (Powell, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part)) (second omission in original)). 
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educational segregation that would be [detrimental to] and 
‘determinative of a child’s opportunity.’” 138 
Although public school officials are not required to take 
affirmative steps to create a racially diverse and integrated 
student body, the Ninth Circuit asserted that it was within the 
discretion of public school officials to adopt and implement 
school assignment plans that combat the harmful consequences 
of racial segregation in public education even though the 
segregation arises from “white flight” or residential patterns.139 
D.  Applying Grutter’s Diversity Rationale to Public School 
Assignment Plans 
The majority in both Comfort and Parents held that public 
school officials have a compelling interest in eliminating racial 
isolation and maintaining integrated public schools.140  At the 
heart of the disagreement between the majority and the 
dissenting judges was whether the school district’s interest in 
diversity, absent a finding of de jure segregation, is the same as 
the university’s interest in creating a diverse student body when 
the assignments to traditional primary and secondary schools do 
not involve competitive academic qualifications.141  As Judge 
Graber stated in her Ninth Circuit panel dissent:  “Recent 
research has identified the critical role of early school experiences 
in breaking down racial and cultural stereotypes.  The research 
further shows that only a desegregated and diverse school can 
offer such opportunities and benefits.  The research further 
supports the proposition that these benefits are long lasting.”142 
 
138 Parents, 377 F.3d at 993 (Graber, J., dissenting) (quoting Comfort, 283 F. 
Supp. 2d at 384). 
139 See Brewer v. W. Irondequoit Cent. Sch. Dist., 212 F.3d 738, 750 (2d Cir. 
2000) (“‘[F]ederal courts have held that local school authorities may legitimately 
take into account the phenomenon of white flight in formulating voluntary 
programs designed to achieve integration.’” (quoting Johnson v. Bd. of Educ. of 
Chi., 604 F.2d 504, 516–17 (7th Cir. 1979), vacated on other grounds, 449 U.S. 915 
(1980))). 
140 See Parents, 426 F.3d at 1173–79; Comfort, 418 F.3d at 16. 
141 Parents, 426 F.3d at 1178–79. 
142 Parents, 377 F.3d at 992 n.9 (Graber, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks 
omitted); see also Parents, 426 F.3d at 1175 (explaining that even the defendant’s 
expert conceded that “diversity encourages students not only to think critically but 
democratically”). 
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Applying Justice O’Connor’s diversity rationale in Grutter 
and the Second Circuit’s desegregation analysis, both the First 
and Ninth Circuits agreed with the Second Circuit that neither 
Bakke nor the Supreme Court’s subsequent cases addressing 
affirmative action held that the government could only survive 
strict scrutiny if it was using race to remedy the effects of past, 
intentional discrimination.143  The Second Circuit was one of the 
first circuit courts to address whether public school officials 
could use race to “ameliorate racial isolation” and integrate a 
school district.144 
In framing the issue, the Second Circuit stated that the 
question was whether the school assignment plan was “narrowly 
tailored to achieve its primary goal of reducing racial isolation 
resulting from de facto segregation.”145  The Second Circuit held 
that the exclusive use of race in the context of primary and 
secondary education did not violate the Equal Protection Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment.146  Thus, the First, Second, and 
Ninth Circuits believed that context defined the state’s interest 
and whether the use of race was narrowly tailored to meet that 
interest. 
Distinguishing Grutter and following the diversity rationale of 
the Second Circuit, the First and Ninth Circuits stated that 
reliance on factors other than race to achieve a diverse student 
body is inapplicable in the context of primary and secondary 
education.  Specifically, the Ninth Circuit stated that “the 
contextual differences between public high schools and selective 
institutions of higher learning make . . . [individualized, holistic 
review] ill-suited for . . . [Grutter’s] narrow tailoring inquiry.”147  
Although the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s faithful 
application of the individualized, holistic review requirement set 
forth in Grutter, it agreed with the First and Ninth Circuits that 
the diversity-based benefits identified in Grutter justified the 
narrowly tailored use of race to determine which students could 
attend which schools.148 
 
143 See Parents, 426 F.3d at 1178–79; Comfort, 418 F.3d at 14, 23. 
144 Brewer, 212 F.3d at 753. 
145 Id. at 752. 
146 See id. at 741. 
147 Parents, 426 F.3d at 1184. 
148 See McFarland ex rel. McFarland v. Jefferson County Pub. Sch., 330 F. Supp. 
2d 834, 837 (W.D. Ky. 2004), aff’d per curiam, 416 F.3d 513 (6th Cir. 2005), rev’d 
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III 
IDEOLOGICAL DIFFERENCES UNSETTLE BROWN AND LIMIT 
THE EXCLUSIVE USE OF RACE IN THE K–12 CONTEXT 
In Parents, Chief Justice Roberts changed the direction of the 
Court from left to right by narrowly interpreting the holdings of 
Brown and Grutter.149 
In his opening statement before the Senate Judiciary 
Committee, Chief Justice Roberts pledged to “uphold[] the rule 
of law and safeguard those liberties that make this land one of 
endless possibilities for all Americans.”150  Based on these 
promises, precedent from the Warren Court, and other decisions 
protecting the victims of discrimination, the disenfranchised 
appeared safe from judicial review and the prospect of being 
overruled.151 
As evidenced by Justice O’Connor’s opinion in Grutter and 
Chief Justice Warren’s opinion in Brown, the commitment to the 
principles of stare decisis means a commitment not only to the 
ultimate outcome in prior Supreme Court cases but also a 
commitment to the principles and policies underlying the 
 
sub nom., Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738 
(2007). 
149 See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738, 
2752–54 (2007). 
150 Hearing on Roberts Nomination Before the Senate Judiciary Committee, supra 
note 13, at 57 (“I will decide every case based on the record, according to the rule of 
law, without fear or favor, to the best of my ability and I will remember that it’s my 
job to call balls and strikes and not to pitch or bat.”). 
151 Beginning with the appointment of Chief Justice Burger in 1969, conservatives 
hoped that the Court would begin to overrule Supreme Court cases that expanded 
the scope of constitutional protections for the indigent, the disenfranchised, and the 
victims of discrimination.  See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) 
(requiring law enforcement officials to inform suspects that they are entitled to an 
attorney, the right to remain silent, and that their statements may be used against 
them in a court of law); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (holding that 
states cannot prohibit the use of birth control).  But replacing Chief Justice Burger 
with Chief Justice Rehnquist and adding Justices Scalia, O’Connor, and Kennedy 
did not produce the conservative results that opponents feared.  See, e.g., Planned 
Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (reaffirming Roe v. Wade, 410 
U.S. 113 (1973)); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (holding that public 
universities could use race-conscious measures in the admissions process); 
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (striking down a Texas state law banning 
homosexual sodomy); Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000) (holding that 
a federal statute permitting courts to admit statements made during a custodial 
interrogation without the Miranda warnings into evidence if the accused made the 
statement voluntarily was unconstitutional). 
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result.152  Hitting all the right notes during his confirmation 
hearing, Chief Justice Roberts opined that “the [C]ourt should 
decide each case on a ground that decides no more than is 
necessary to resolve the dispute before it.”153 
Replacing Chief Justice Rehnquist with Chief Justice Roberts 
and Justice O’Connor with Justice Alito has created a Court that 
is willing to limit the power of the government to initiate and 
promote social programs that protect the victims of 
discrimination and the disenfranchised by limiting the effect of 
Supreme Court precedent.154  Together with Justices Scalia and 
Thomas, Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito insist that they 
are relying on judicial restraint as the foundation for 
constitutional and statutory analysis.155  In reality, however, 
Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito have chipped away at the 
scope and effect of constitutional protections by adopting a 
narrow view of precedent.156  Under this narrow view, Chief 
Justice Roberts and Justice Alito limited earlier decisions to 
their facts or refused to apply the principles and policies 
 
152 Compare Grutter, 539 U.S. at 323–24 (examining the rationale underlying 
Justice Powell’s conclusion that student body diversity is a compelling state interest 
and how universities can satisfy that interest), with Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 
483, 493–94 (1954) (comparing the rationale of cases desegregating law schools to 
desegregating public schools). 
153  Stone, supra note 13 (stating that Chief Justice Roberts believes that “the 
Supreme Court [should] decide[] cases narrowly, resolving only the particular 
dispute before it”).  See generally Hearing on Roberts Nomination Before the Senate 
Judiciary Committee, supra note 13 (explaining that the role of the Court is not to 
shape policy but interpret the law). 
154 In addition to finding that the exclusive use of race to make public school 
assignments was unconstitutional, the Court in a series of five-to-four opinions, held 
that a federal ban on late term abortion procedures was unconstitutional, Gonzales 
v. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. 1610, 1619 (2007), struck down the electioneering 
communication provision of the Bipartisan Campaign Finance Reform Act, which 
prohibited special interest groups from airing negative candidate ads within thirty 
days of a primary and within sixty days of a general election, Fed. Election Comm’n 
v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2652, 2658–59 (2007), and held that that 
taxpayers lacked standing to challenge faith-based initiatives, Hein v. Freedom 
From Religion Found., Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2553, 2559 (2007). 
155 See Right to Life, 127 S. Ct. at 2684 n.7 (Scalia, J., concurring) (characterizing 
Chief Justice Roberts’s application of stare decisis as “faux judicial restraint”). 
156 See id. at 2683 n.7 (“Indeed, [Chief Justice Roberts’s] attempt at distinguishing 
[the Court’s prior precedent] is unpersuasive enough, and the change in the law it 
works is substantial enough, that seven Justices of this Court, having widely 
divergent views concerning the constitutionality of the restrictions at issue, agree 
that the opinion effectively overrules [the prior precedent] without saying so.”). 
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underlying the results.157  Disguising judicial activism as judicial 
restraint, Chief Justice Roberts was able to overrule the liberal 
precedent of the Warren, Burger, and Rehnquist Courts and 
deliver a victory for conservatives by ending state-sanctioned, 
race-based affirmative action in the K–12 context.158 
No case demonstrates Chief Justice Roberts’s ability to 
achieve a conservative objective while at the same time 
protecting previous judicial decisions better than this term’s 
decision in Parents.  Unlike Chief Justice Warren and Justice 
O’Connor, Chief Justice Roberts does not look beyond the letter 
of the law to deduce an outcome consonant with the principles 
and policies underlying the holdings of the Court’s prior 
precedent.159  Instead, Chief Justice Roberts simply finds that the 
facts of the current situation are distinguishable from the facts of 
the prior cases.  This allows him to reach his desired outcome 
without disturbing the Supreme Court’s prior precedent. 
A.  Chief Justice Warren’s Analysis of the “Separate but Equal” 
Doctrine 
The Supreme Court in Brown eliminated the state-sanctioned 
practice that most will agree is inherently and morally unjust:  
 
157 See, e.g., Hein, 127 S. Ct. at 2571–72 (stating that the Court should neither 
extend nor overrule the Court’s prior precedent; it simply should let it stand). 
158 Chief Justice Roberts did not expressly overrule inconsistent precedent in 
delivering victories for conservatives; instead, he distinguished the facts of the prior 
cases from the current case before the Court, or he held that the earlier case did not 
apply on the merits.  For example, in Gonzales v. Carhart, the Court did not disturb 
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, which reaffirmed Roe v. 
Wade and struck down a Pennsylvania law that required women to notify their 
sexual partners before having an abortion.  Gonzales, 127 S. Ct. at 1619 (holding 
that a federal ban on late-term abortions was constitutional).  Likewise, the Court 
did not overrule McConnell v. Federal Election Commission, which held that the 
Bipartisan Campaign Finance Reform Act was constitutional; instead, the Court 
rendered the Act meaningless by holding that the its key provision was 
unconstitutional.  Right to Life, 127 S. Ct. 2658–59. 
159 Compare Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 
2738, 2746 (2007) (holding that the Equal Protection Clause prohibits the racial 
classification of public schoolchildren), with Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 
492–93 (1954) (“We must consider public education in the light of its full 
development and its present place in American life throughout the nation.”), and 
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 323 (2003) (discussing “Justice Powell’s decision 
in some detail” to determine whether the methods designed from and based on his 
opinion were constitutional). 
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the use of race to oppress and isolate black schoolchildren.160  In 
that case, the Supreme Court found that racially segregated 
schools did not provide the same opportunities and advantages 
to black schoolchildren as white, even though “there [were] 
findings below that Negro and white schools involved have been 
equalized, or are being equalized, with respect to buildings, 
curricula, qualifications and salaries of teachers, and other 
‘tangible’ factors.”161  Thus, the appeal focused on “the effect of 
segregation itself on public education.”162 
In Brown, the petitioners asked the Supreme Court to decide: 
(1) Whether the State of Kansas [had] power to enforce a state 
statute pursuant to which racially segregated public primary 
schools are maintained. 
(2) Whether the [U.S. District Court of Kansas’s finding] that 
racial segregation . . . [had] the detrimental effect of retarding 
the mental and educational development of [black] children     
. . . .
163
 
The Supreme Court, in a unanimous opinion, held that states, 
including Kansas, could not enforce statutes that maintained 
racially segregated schools.164  It reasoned that the harmful 
effects of racially segregated schools violated the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because 
segregation denied black schoolchildren the tangible benefits of 
public education.165 
Unlike Chief Justice Roberts’s narrow application of 
precedent, Chief Justice Warren construed the Court’s prior 
holdings broadly to support the Court’s conclusion that 
“separate educational facilities are inherently unequal.”166  Chief 
Justice Warren relied on the Court’s graduate school cases 
 
160 Brown, 347 U.S. at 494 (“The impact [of segregation] is greater when it has 
the sanction of the law; for the policy of separating the races is usually interpreted 
as denoting the inferiority of the negro group.  A sense of inferiority affects the 
motivation.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
161 Id. at 492. 
162 Id. 
163 Brief of Appellants at 2, Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (No. 1), 
1952 WL 47265. 
164 Brown, 347 U.S. at 495. 
165 Id. at 493. 
166 Id. at 495 (stating that “in the field of public education the doctrine of 
‘separate but equal’” violates “the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the 
Fourteenth Amendment”). 
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holding that in the context of higher education state officials 
violated the Equal Protection Clause when they denied “specific 
benefits enjoyed by white students . . . to Negro students of the 
same educational qualifications.”167  For example, in Sweatt v. 
Painter, the Supreme Court required Texas to admit African 
Americans to the law school, because the evidence showed that 
the newly created law school for African Americans did not have 
the same faculty, library, or other intangible resources available 
to the all-white alumni.168 
Implicit in Chief Justice Warren’s analysis is the recognition 
that the doctrine of stare decisis does not prevent the Court from 
overruling prior precedent if that precedent is based on outdated 
social policies or unduly burdens affected litigants.169  In writing 
his opinion, Chief Justice Warren analyzed the doctrine of 
separate but equal, including the scope and effect of Plessy on 
public education, in detail.170  He stated that:  “American courts 
have . . . labored with the doctrine for over half a century,” and 
emphasized that the Court could not “turn the clock back to 
1896 . . . when Plessy v. Ferguson was written.”171  Instead, the 
Court needed to “consider public education in light of its full 
development and its present place in American life throughout 
the Nation.  Only in this way . . . [could the Court] determine[] if 
segregation in public schools deprives these plaintiffs of the 
equal protection of the laws.”172 
In Brown, Chief Justice Warren expressly found that the 
harmful effects of racial segregation in the K–12 context were 
the same as the harmful effects of racial segregation in the 
context of higher education.173  In reaching his conclusion that 
“separate educational facilities [were] inherently unequal,” he 
examined the nature of the rights at issue, and the principles and 
policies underlying the holdings of the Court’s prior cases in 
deciding whether the racial segregation of public schoolchildren 
violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
 
167 Id. at 492. 
168 Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 633–34 (1950). 
169 See Brown, 347 U.S. at 494–95. 
170 Id. at 494 nn.10 & 11. 
171 Id. at 491–92. 
172 Id. at 492–93. 
173 Id. at 493–95. 
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Amendment.174  Chief Justice Warren’s analysis in Brown 
became the legal foundation for the Court’s future holdings that 
all state-sanctioned racial segregation was unconstitutional.175 
B.  The Conservative Reinterpretation of Brown’s Equal 
Educational Opportunities 
Chief Justice Roberts overruled the Court’s prior cases that 
permitted the benign use of race to eliminate racial segregation 
and isolation when he refused to extend Brown’s desegregation 
rationale to meet the current problems of de facto segregation 
and limited Grutter to its facts.176  As previously stated, in 
Parents, the petitioners sued the Seattle and Louisville School 
Districts alleging that the school district assignment plans 
violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment when the school districts prevented students from 
attending the schools of their choice based on the race of the 
students.  Under these plans, a student could not attend the 
chosen school if the student’s race upset the desired racial 
balance of that school.177  Thus, the student’s race determined 
whether the school district would prevent the student from 
attending the chosen school.178 
Chief Justice Roberts stated that Brown promised that 
children would not be sent to a particular school on the basis of 
 
174 Id. 
175 See, e.g., Heart of Atlanta Hotel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 261–62 
(1964) (holding that Congress had authority to require states and private entities to 
comply with the 1964 Civil Rights Act and provide access to public accommodations 
without regard to an individual’s race); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 295 
(1964) (holding that Congress had authority to require states and private entities to 
comply with the 1964 Civil Rights Act and provide equal access to restaurants 
regardless of race). 
176 In Brown, the Court was asked to end de jure segregation, which was 
segregation imposed by state and local laws that were enforced by public school 
officials.  See Brown, 347 U.S. at 487–88; see also Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. 
Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738, 2802 (2007) (Breyer, J., dissenting).  On the 
other hand, in more recent school desegregation cases, the Court was asked 
whether public school officials could use race to eliminate de facto segregation, 
which is segregation that is “caused by housing patterns or generalized societal 
discrimination.”  Id. 
177 Parents, 127 S. Ct. at 2750. 
178 See id. at 2746–50. 
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their race.179  Relying on a narrow interpretation of the 
principles articulated in Brown, he concluded that the racial 
classification of public schoolchildren is per se 
unconstitutional.180 
In analyzing whether the Ninth Circuit erred in holding that 
the exclusive use of race to integrate primary and secondary 
schools was constitutionally permissible, Chief Justice Roberts 
held that Grutter was factually inapposite.181  He recognized that 
student body diversity is a compelling state interest in the 
context of higher education, and stated that in Grutter, the 
“Court relied upon considerations unique to institutions of 
higher education, noting that in light of ‘the expansive freedoms 
of speech and thought associated with the university 
environment, universities occupy a special niche in our 
constitutional tradition.’”182  Relying on this specific language, 
Chief Justice Roberts held that Grutter did not govern the use of 
race in the K–12 context.183 
Although Chief Justice Roberts held that Grutter did not 
apply in the K–12 context, he still used the Grutter diversity 
factors to foreclose its application in the K–12 context.184  Chief 
Justice Roberts conceded for the sake of argument that the 
school districts’ desire to eliminate racial segregation and 
isolation in primary and secondary schools was a compelling 
state interest.185  Nevertheless, he held that the school districts 
failed to meet their burden of showing that the plans were 
narrowly tailored because the school districts were using racial 
quotas to achieve the benefits of student body diversity.186 
In limiting the scope and effect of Grutter, Chief Justice 
Roberts did not attack Grutter’s holding or rationale.  Instead, 
 
179 See id. at 2753 (explaining that the assignment plans before the Court made 
the student’s “race . . . determinative standing alone”); cf. Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 
U.S. 244, 270 (2003) (holding that the exclusive use of race to determine which 
student was entitled to attend the university violated the Equal Protection Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment). 
180 Parents, 127 S. Ct. at 2768. 
181 Id. at 2754. 
182 Id. (quoting Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 329 (2003)). 
183 Id. 
184 See id. at 2751–58. 
185 See id. at 2752. 
186 Id. at 2755. 
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he purportedly invoked the traditions of judicial restraint.187  
Despite this “faux judicial restraint,” Chief Justice Roberts 
understands the impact that distinguishing current cases from 
prior Supreme Court cases can have as an effective tool for 
advancing a conservative social and political agenda.188  By 
distinguishing current cases from prior Supreme Court cases, he 
is able to bury precedent that does not reflect the conservative 
ideology of the Court. 
Like Justices Scalia and Thomas who believe that racial 
classifications violate the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment,189 Chief Justice Roberts believes that 
racial classifications are per se unconstitutional.  Under the 
approach advocated by Justices Scalia and Thomas, however, the 
Court should overrule prior Supreme Court cases if the previous 
majority applied the incorrect legal standard or failed to follow 
the plain and ordinary meaning of the words used in the 
Constitution or federal statute.190  But, by holding that Grutter 
did not apply in the K–12 context, Chief Justice Roberts was 
able to eliminate another state-sanctioned, race-based 
affirmative action program without expressly overruling prior 
Supreme Court cases that permitted the voluntary use of race to 
achieve student body diversity.191 
 
187 See generally Fed. Election Comm’n v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2652, 
2684–85 (2007) (Scalia, J., concurring) (discussing principle of stare decisis); Hein v. 
Freedom from Religion Found., Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2553, 2572 (2007) (disagreeing with 
Justice Scalia that the present case required the Court to reconsider its prior 
precedent because the earlier Court erred in its interpretation of the law; instead, 
Chief Justice Roberts “decide[d] only the case at hand” pursuant to the Court’s 
Article III role of resolving cases and controversies presently before the Court). 
188 Compare Right to Life, 127 S. Ct. at 2684 (Scalia, J., concurring) (arguing that 
the Court should have overruled McConnell v. Federal Election Commission 
because previous majority should have held that section 203 of the Act was 
unconstitutional), with Parents, 127 S. Ct. at 2772 (Thomas, J., concurring) 
(explaining that the government must present “‘strong basis in evidence . . . that 
remedial action [is] necessary’” to combat past discrimination (quoting City of 
Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 500 (1989))). 
189 See, e.g., Parents, 127 S. Ct. at 2770–71 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“[A]s a 
general rule, all race-based government decisionmaking–regardless of context–is 
unconstitutional.”). 
190 See Right to Life, 127 S. Ct. at 2684–85 (Scalia, J., concurring); see also Hein, 
127 S. Ct. at 2574–70 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
191 See Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 242 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring 
in part and dissenting in part) (“School boards . . . [are] free to develop and initiate 
further plans to promote school desegregation. . . . Nothing in this opinion 
[requiring parties to show that the government was a passive participant in a public 
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C.  The New Conservative Ideology Causes the Liberal Justices to 
Strike Out 
In Parents, Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, Souter, and Stevens 
voted to affirm the judgment of the Ninth Circuit in favor of the 
school district.192  As evidenced by the dissenting opinions in 
Parents, these four Justices find the conservative agenda of Chief 
Justice Roberts, and fellow Justices Alito, Scalia, and Thomas 
frustrating and perplexing because these conservative Justices 
apply the law to facts without consideration of whether the 
outcome is consistent with the values embodied in the law.193  In 
his Parents dissent, Justice Stevens stated that:  “It [was his] firm 
conviction that . . . the Court that [he] joined in 1975 would [not] 
have agreed with [the Court’s] decision” that Brown prohibited 
the use of voluntary efforts to integrate public schoolchildren.194 
Likewise, Justice Breyer’s dissenting opinion in Parents rejects 
Chief Justice Roberts’s conclusion that Brown prohibits the use 
of racial classifications to eliminate the harmful effects of de 
facto segregation upon public schoolchildren.195  In his dissent, 
Justice Breyer found that the race-conscious assignment plans 
were narrowly tailored.196  The rationale for his conclusion was 
two-fold:  first, the exclusive use of race to achieve student body 
diversity in primary and secondary education was consistent with 
the moral values embodied in the Constitution; and second, 
prior Supreme Court cases permitted public school officials to 
 
system of racial discrimination] is meant to discourage school boards from 
exceeding minimal constitutional standards in promoting the values of an integrated 
school experience.”); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 25–
26 (1971) (explaining that public school officials have authority to adopt policies 
that ensure each school’s population reflects the racial composition of the school 
district as a whole); N.C. State Bd. of Educ. v. Swann, 402 U.S. 43, 45 (1971) 
(explaining that public school officials may develop policies to achieve racial 
balance in their schools). 
192 See Parents, 127 S. Ct. at 2800 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
193 See, e.g., Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 313 (2001) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting) (“[I]f the majority is genuinely committed to deciphering congressional 
intent, its unwillingness to even consider evidence as to the context in which 
Congress legislated is perplexing.  Congress does not legislate in a vacuum. . . . 
[T]he objective manifestations of congressional intent . . . must be measured in light 
of the enacting Congress’ expectations as to how the judiciary might evaluate [the 
statute].”) 
194 Parents, 127 S. Ct. at 2800 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
195 See id. at 2834 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
196 See id. at 2824–36. 
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adopt race-conscious assignment plans that reflect the racial 
composition of the district as a whole.197 
In concluding that the race-based assignment plans were 
constitutionally permissible, Justice Breyer emphasized the 
historical context that created the need for voluntary 
desegregation efforts, the role of the courts in protecting the 
voluntary desegregation efforts of public school officials, and the 
proper method for interpreting federal law.198  In interpreting 
the Equal Protection Clause, Justice Breyer applied a two-step 
test:  first, he examined the consequences that would flow from 
giving the law one interpretation over another; and second, he 
analyzed whether the consequences were consistent with the 
underlying values embodied in the Constitution and the 
Supreme Court’s prior cases.199 
This approach is consistent with Chief Justice Warren’s 
approach in Brown.  In Brown, Chief Justice Warren found that 
state-sanctioned racial segregation adversely “affect[ed] [the] 
hearts and minds [of children] in a way unlikely ever to be 
undone.”200  Likewise, in Parents, Justice Breyer found that the 
elimination of de facto segregation positively affected the 
“hearts and minds” of public schoolchildren.201 
In Parents, Justice Breyer identified three positive effects that 
justified the narrowly tailored use of race to eliminate de facto 
segregation:  “setting right the consequences of prior conditions 
of [state-sanctioned] segregation”; increasing academic 
performance; and creating an integrated learning environment 
that increases interracial sociability and friendship and enhances 
“the kind of cooperation among Americans of all races that is 
necessary to make a land of three hundred million people one 
Nation.”202 
After examining the consequences that would occur if public 
school officials were allowed to rely exclusively on race as the 
tool for eliminating de facto segregation, Justice Breyer 
addressed whether public school officials are entitled to have the 
 
197 See id. at 2825–34. 
198 See id. at 2801–11, 2813–20. 
199 See id. at 2824–34. 
200 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954). 
201 See Parents, 127 S. Ct. at 2820–21 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
202 Id. at 2820–22. 
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Court protect their actions when they are not using race as a tool 
of oppression or segregation or for preferential treatment to a 
limited governmental resource.203  In his Parents dissent, Justice 
Breyer noted that both the Supreme Court and an overwhelming 
majority of the circuit courts recognized the right of school 
districts to adopt measures that would “‘prepare students to live 
in a pluralistic society.’”204  Justice Breyer concluded that neither 
the Constitution nor the Court’s prior cases prohibited school 
districts from using race as the sole means for eliminating the 
harmful effects of racial isolation upon public schoolchildren, 
regardless of whether the isolation arises from de jure or de 
facto segregation.205 
Once again, Justice Breyer’s analysis is consistent with Chief 
Justice Warren’s analysis in Brown.  In Brown, Chief Justice 
Warren held that segregated “educational facilities [were] 
inherently unequal” and violated the Equal Protection Clause.206  
In Parents, Justice Breyer relied on the constitutional values of 
equality embodied in Brown’s holding to conclude that the race-
conscious measures were constitutionally permissible.207 
Comparing Chief Justice Roberts’s majority opinion in 
Parents with Justice Breyer’s dissenting opinion in Parents shows 
that distinguishing prior cases from current cases is an effective 
tool for overruling prior Supreme Court cases when a justice is 
dissatisfied with the results of the prior cases.  Justice Breyer’s 
interpretation that Brown prohibits the racial segregation of 
public schoolchildren is significantly different than Chief Justice 
Roberts’s interpretation that Brown prohibits the racial 
classification of public schoolchildren.208 
 
203 See id. at 2811–20. 
204 Id. at 2811–12 (quoting Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 
U.S. 1, 16 (1971)); see id. at 2814–15. 
205 See id. at 2811–16 (citing Bustop, Inc. v. Bd. of Educ. of L.A., 439 U.S. 1380, 
1383 (1978)). 
206 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954). 
207 See Parents, 127 S. Ct. at 2834 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (stating that “since this 
Court’s decision in Brown, the law has consistently and unequivocally approved of 
both voluntary and compulsory race-conscious measures to combat segregated 
schools”). 
208 Compare id. at 2768 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.) (“The way to stop 
discrimination on the basis of race is to stop discriminating on the basis of race.”), 
with id. at 2834–35 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“The Equal Protection Clause . . . has 
always distinguished in practice between state action that excludes and thereby 
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Unlike Chief Justice Roberts who used Brown as a shield to 
prohibit the exclusive use of racial classifications to integrate 
primary and secondary schools, Justice Breyer was willing to use 
Brown as a sword to dismantle the continuing legacy of racial 
segregation in public education.209  As Chief Justice Roberts’s 
and Justice Breyer’s Parents opinions illustrate, the Court’s 
interpretation of federal law depends not only on the Justices’ 
ideological philosophy on the proper method for interpreting 
federal law, but on the political and social agenda that the 
Justices hope to advance based upon those interpretations.210  
D.  Justice Kennedy, the Pragmatic Conservative, Bridges the 
Ideological Paradigm Between Conservative Legal Process and 
Judicial Lawmaking 
Despite the detailed analysis that followed the outcome and 
rationale of the Court’s prior cases, Justice Breyer could not 
convince Justice Kennedy that the school plans at issue were 
narrowly tailored.  Justice Kennedy wrote a concurring opinion 
that agreed with the dissent on two very important points:  first, 
the elimination of racial segregation and isolation in public 
primary and secondary education is a compelling state interest; 
second, that public school officials could use race to achieve that 
interest absent a finding of de jure segregation.211  Nevertheless, 
Justice Kennedy found that the specific race-conscious plans 
before the Court in Parents failed the narrowly tailored prong of 
strict scrutiny because they failed to satisfy the Grutter narrowly 
tailored factors.212  Because Justice Kennedy held that the 
 
subordinates racial minorities and state action that seeks to bring together people of 
all races.”). 
209 Compare id. at 2768 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.) (explaining that Brown 
prohibits the exclusive, nonremedial use of race to eliminate public school 
segregation), with id. at 2836 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (explaining that Brown 
promised “true racial equality–not as a matter of fine words on paper, but as a 
matter of everyday life in the Nation’s cities and schools”). 
210 See id. at 2768 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“The Court holds that state entities 
may not experiment with race-based means to achieve ends that they deem socially 
desirable.”).  But see id. at 2788 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (stating that his views 
prevented him from joining Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion in Parents because the 
Chief Justice’s approach was “inconsistent in both its approach and its implications 
with the history, meaning, and reach of the Equal Protection Clause”). 
211 See id. at 2791. 
212 See id. at 2788. 
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diversity benefits identified in the context of higher education 
apply to the K–12 context, his concurring opinion controls the 
use of race to integrate public primary and secondary schools.213  
Thus, Justice Kennedy’s Parents analysis stands at the center of 
the ideological divide among the current Court. 
Although conservative in mindset and jurisprudence, Justice 
Kennedy tends to follow both the outcome and rationale of the 
Court’s prior cases.  He bridges the ideological gap between 
Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Breyer by balancing the need 
for judicial stability against the factual assumptions underlying 
the Court’s prior cases and the current dispute.214  This balancing 
test allows Justice Kennedy to interpret the law rather than read 
his own policy preferences into the law.215  Under this approach, 
the role of the Court is to exercise judicial restraint based on the 
application of the Court’s prior precedent to subsequent cases.  
Based on Justice Kennedy’s approach to interpreting federal 
law, the Court may only avoid the application of stare decisis if 
the prior judicial decision is factually distinguishable, the prior 
judicial decision addressed questions that are not at issue in the 
case, or the factual assumptions underlying the dispute in the 
prior judicial decision are outdated.216 
To understand the importance of Justice Kennedy’s 
concurring opinion in Parents, it is important to understand 
whether and when a Supreme Court decision is binding or 
nonbinding precedent.  Generally, lower courts are required to 
follow the outcome and rationale of a prior case if, in a factually 
similar situation, a higher level court in the same jurisdiction has 
applied the same law.217  For example, federal circuit and district 
courts, as well as state courts, applying federal law are required 
 
213 See, e.g., Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977). 
214 See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 853 (1992) (“[T]he 
reservations any of us may have in reaffirming . . . Roe are outweighed by the 
explication of individual liberty we have given combined with the force of stare 
decisis.”). 
215 See, e.g., id. at 854–55 (explaining that Roe established a woman’s right to 
choose whether and when to have a child, and that the legal and factual 
assumptions underlying a woman’s right to choose had not changed); cf. Brown v. 
Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493–95 (1954) (explaining that the factual assumption 
that separate but equal facilities did not cause Negroes undue or unreasonable harm 
was incorrect). 
216 See Casey, 505 U.S. at 854–55. 
217 See 2A FEDERAL PROCEDURE LAWYERS EDITION, supra note 81, § 3:789. 
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to follow the rules set forth by the U.S. Supreme Court.218  
Traditionally, the judicial decision, its outcome, and its rationale 
are binding upon the lower courts.219  The outcome and rationale 
of the dissenting opinion has no effect upon the lower court 
because the dissenting opinion is not binding authority.220  The 
lower courts may consider the dissent’s arguments in evaluating 
subsequent cases, but they cannot apply the dissenting opinion 
to reach a result that is inconsistent or contrary to the majority’s 
opinion.221 
If a majority of the Justices agree on the outcome, but 
disagree on the analytical framework for resolving the dispute, 
the outcome is still binding on lower courts applying the same 
law in factually similar situations.222  This is known as a plurality 
opinion.223  Unlike a majority opinion, a plurality opinion 
represents a decision in which the outcome received a greater 
number of votes than any other outcome.224  In a plurality 
opinion, the justice’s rationale that expresses the narrowest 
grounds for the outcome is the only rationale that is binding 
upon the lower courts.225  Thus, the scope and effect of prior 
judicial decisions cannot be based solely on the number of 
Justices who voted in favor of one party over another. 
Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion in Parents is binding 
upon the lower courts because he agreed with Chief Justice 
Roberts that the school assignment plans before the Court 
violated the Equal Protection Clause; however, he remained 
faithful to the legal principles set forth in Grutter and Gratz 
concerning the use of race as a plus factor to achieve student 
body diversity.226  As previously discussed, a race-conscious 
admissions policy will survive strict scrutiny if the policy is based 
 
218 See id. § 3:791. 
219 See id. 
220 See id. 
221 See id. 
222 See id. §§ 3:790, 3:791. 
223 See id. § 3:791. 
224 See id. 
225 See Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (explaining that a 
concurring opinion is binding if it is the opinion that resolves the issue before the 
Court on the narrowest of grounds). 
226 Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738, 
2788–89 (2007) (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
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on individual assessments, in which race is only one 
consideration among many in deciding whether to admit 
students.227 
In Parents, Justice Kennedy agreed with the dissent that 
student body diversity is a compelling state interest, and that 
public school officials could use race to achieve that interest.228  
As evidenced by his opinions, Justice Kennedy’s approach to 
determining the scope and effect of prior judicial decisions is 
similar to his liberal colleagues.229  He uses a three-step test to 
determine the scope and effect of the Court’s prior precedent.  
First, he examines the conflict in the current case to determine 
whether the Court has previously addressed and resolved the 
conflict.  Second, if the answer is yes, he identifies the legal 
principles that the previous majority used to resolve the conflict.  
Finally, he determines whether the Court needs to modify, 
change, or overrule the existing law.230  In deciding whether the 
existing rule is still viable, Justice Kennedy considers the 
following factors:  (i) whether the factual assumptions 
underlying the current conflict are similar to the factual 
assumptions underlying the previous conflict; (ii) whether the 
legal assumptions that are relevant to the conflict are the same 
as the legal assumptions underlying the prior conflict; and (iii) 
whether the potential outcome is consistent or inconsistent with 
the factual or legal assumptions that were used to resolve the 
prior conflict.231 
Like Justice Breyer’s dissent, Justice Kennedy’s concurrence 
recognizes the Court’s duty to examine the rights at issue and 
the effect of the Court’s interpretation of the law on those 
rights.232  Refusing to sign off on the majority’s opinion, Justice 
Kennedy explained that the public school officials in the 
companion cases before the Court failed to show race-neutral 
alternatives were unavailable to eliminate the harmful effects of 
 
227 Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 274 (2003); see also Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 
U.S. 306, 340 (2003) (explaining that a race-conscious admissions policy will survive 
strict scrutiny if the process is designed to “assemble a student body that is diverse 
in ways broader than race”). 
228 See Parents, 127 S. Ct. at 2791–92 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
229 See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 853 (1992). 
230 See id. 
231 See id. at 853–55. 
232 See Parents, 127 S. Ct. at 2794–95 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
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segregated housing patterns.233  Nevertheless, Justice Kennedy 
recognized that Brown established a moral imperative to 
eradicate racial injustice in public education.234  He also 
recognized that Brown had changed society and its values.235 
Although courts have struggled to achieve Brown’s mandate 
of eliminating the harmful effects of racial segregation upon 
public schoolchildren, Justice Kennedy did not believe that the 
Court’s affirmative action or public school precedent had 
foreclosed the use of race as a tool for eliminating those 
effects.236  Finally, Justice Kennedy found that the facts 
demonstrating the advantages and disadvantages of racial 
diversity in public education had not changed since the Court’s 
holding that separate but equal in the context of public 
education was unconstitutional.237 
Despite Justice Kennedy’s willingness to follow the Court’s 
prior precedent permitting the voluntary use of race to eliminate 
racial segregation and isolation, his requirement that public 
school officials comply with the Grutter diversity factors 
undermines those efforts because school districts do not have the 
resources to meet the Grutter test of individualized, holistic 
review.238  The plurality opinion in Parents leaves intact the 
authority of public school officials to adopt voluntary race-
conscious measures aimed at eliminating the harmful affects of 
de facto segregation.239  But, like the plurality opinion in Bakke 
that left unresolved the issue of whether student body diversity 
was a compelling state interest, the Parents decision leaves 
unresolved what race-conscious measures will survive judicial 
scrutiny.  Thus, conservatives were able to count Parents as a 
 
233 See id. at 2790–91. 
234 See id. at 2797. 
235 See id. at 2791, 2797. 
236 See id. at 2791. 
237 See id. at 2791–93. 
238 See Justin M. Norton, 9th Cir. Strikes Diversity Program, RECORDER (S.F., 
Cal.), July 25, 2004, at 1, available at http://www.law.com/jsp/printerfriendly 
.jsp?c=LawArticle&t=PrinterFriendlyArticle&cid=1090180187397 (“I don’t know 
of any program that I’ve examined that can meet those requirements-especially in K 
through 12 public education.”  (quoting Sharon Browne, Principal Attorney, Pacific 
Legal Foundation) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
239 See Parents, 127 S. Ct. at 2761 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.).  Chief Justice 
Roberts’s discussion of the distinction between de jure and de facto segregation was 
not joined by a majority of the court.  See id. at 2746. 
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victory that limited state-sanctioned, race-based affirmative 
action.240 
IV 
USING SES FACTORS TO MEET BROWN’S VISION OF 
ELIMINATING THE HARMFUL EFFECTS OF RACIAL 
SEGREGATION AND ISOLATION 
Parents, a plurality opinion, does not prohibit primary school 
officials from considering race in deciding whether students may 
attend the school of their choice; however, the reality is that 
Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion severely limits the ability 
to use race as a tool for eliminating de facto segregation.  
Consequently, public school officials may turn to socioeconomic 
status (“SES”) factors to eliminate the harmful effects of racial 
isolation and segregation upon public schoolchildren without the 
fear that courts will find an equal protection violation.241  
Although previous Court majorities, including Justice Kennedy, 
have recognized that the public school context permits the 
voluntary use of race to end the harmful effects of racial 
segregation and isolation, the application of the Grutter diversity 
factors will defeat any plan that relies solely on a student’s race 
to exclude the student from attending a particular school.242  
Fulfilling Brown’s vision of an integrated learning environment 
requires balancing competing social values that ensure both legal 
stability and social cohesion.243  Public school officials can 
 
240 See George Will, Editorial, Clueless in Seattle, WASH. POST, Dec. 3, 2006, at 
B07 (“The Supreme Court has said that all racial classifications are ‘presumptively 
invalid’ unless narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest. . . . 
Supreme Court deference to [the Seattle School District’s use of race] would make 
a mockery of the equal protection guarantee.”). 
241 See OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., ACHIEVING 
DIVERSITY:  RACE-NEUTRAL ALTERNATIVES IN AMERICAN EDUCATION 61–70 
(2004), available at http://www.edu.gov/about/list/ocr/raceneutral.html [hereinafter 
ACHIEVING DIVERSITY]. 
242 See generally Richard D. Kahlenberg, Socioeconomic School Integration, 85 
N.C. L. REV. 1545, 1554, 1555 n.48 (2007) (explaining that “[u]nder longstanding 
Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence, the government’s use of race is held to a 
tough standard of strict scrutiny” and noting the legal distinctions between Grutter 
and Gratz). 
243 See id. at 1555 n.49 (explaining that “[r]acial integration is important to 
furthering . . . goals” that promote academic achievement and good citizenship, and 
that “[e]ven opponents of using race in student assignment concede that using 
socioeconomic status [to achieve these goals] is perfectly legal”). 
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achieve Brown’s vision and survive constitutional challenges to 
their efforts if they use economic classifications to achieve 
student body diversity rather than racial classifications.244  
Economic diversity focuses on assigning students to a particular 
school based upon socioeconomic preferences or economic 
affirmative action.245  These plans favor applicants who “have 
faced various social and economic obstacles.”246 
The statistics further suggest that a family’s household 
income, including the parents’ educational and occupational 
background, is a sound predictor of academic stability and 
student achievement.247  Using SES factors to create diverse 
student populations is based on research showing that academic 
success or failure is based on poverty rather than race.248  The 
effectiveness of SES-based plans is demonstrated by research 
that shows in an economically diverse student population 
academic achievement is valued and academic aspirations are 
high; the school achieves student body diversity based on a 
cross-cultural mix of students; behavior issues are minimal; and 
at-risk, at-need students do not overwhelm teachers, staff, and 
administrators.249 
Relying on this research, schools limit the number of available 
seats for students who are eligible for free or reduced-price 
lunches.250  Typically, the percentage of students eligible for free 
or reduced-price lunches does not exceed forty percent of the 
total available seats.251  While race is not an outcome 
determinative factor in making school assignments, proponents 
claim that racial and ethnic minority students benefit from the 
use of the SES factors based upon the economic realities that 
affect many African American and Latino families.252  Statistics 
show that thirty-five percent of African American families that 
are headed by a female and thirty-four percent of Hispanic 
families that are headed by a female live below the poverty 
 
244 Id. at 1554–55. 
245 ACHIEVING DIVERSITY, supra note 241, at 61. 
246 Id. 
247 Id. at 62–63. 
248 See id. 
249 See id. at 64. 
250 Id. at 67. 
251 See, e.g., id. 
252 Id. at 62. 
 2007] Colorblind Context 721 
line.253  Studies also indicate that poor African Americans are six 
times more likely to live in areas of concentrated poverty.254  The 
same studies indicate comparable results for poor Hispanics.255 
On the other hand, only seventeen percent of non-Hispanic 
white female-headed households live below the poverty line.256  
Six percent of African American two-parent households and 
fourteen percent of Hispanic two-parent households live below 
the poverty line.257  Only three percent of non-Hispanic white 
two-parent families live below the poverty line.258  Statistics also 
indicate that the greatest factor in educational achievement is 
socioeconomic status.  Recent studies show that the reading level 
of a low-income twelfth grade student is the same level as the 
average eighth grade, middle-class student; twenty-five percent 
of students from the lowest-income quintile drop out of high 
school compared to two percent of students in the highest 
quintile; and four percent of low-income students obtain their 
bachelor’s degrees compared to seventy-six percent of high-
income students.259 
Legally, the benefits of creating an economically diverse 
student body are threefold.  First, economic diversity is subject 
to rational basis review rather than strict scrutiny.  Second, the 
burden of proof is on the challengers to show that the 
government’s efforts are unreasonable rather than on the 
government to show that their actions are narrowly tailored. 
Finally, even if the economic assignment plans are subject to 
strict scrutiny, a student’s race is a plus factor rather than 
outcome determinative.260 
 
253 Id. 
254 Id. 
255 Id. 
256 Id. at 63 fig.3. 
257 Id. 
258 Id. 
259 Id. at 63. 
260 Compare Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 483–87 (1970) (holding that 
social and economic legislation is subject to rational basis review), with City of 
Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 92 (1980) (Stevens, J., concurring) (“[A] political 
decision that is supported by valid and articulable justifications cannot be invalid 
simply because some participants in the decisionmaking process were motivated by 
a purpose to disadvantage a minority group.”), and Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 
306, 336, 339 (2003) (explaining that race-conscious measures are constitutionally 
permissible if they are one of several factors used in the decision-making process). 
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A.  Economic Diversity Is Subject to Rational Basis Review 
Because public school officials are relying on SES factors to 
make assignments, they do not have to satisfy the requirements 
of strict scrutiny.261  Public school officials intend the assignments 
to eliminate the harmful effects of poverty upon public 
schoolchildren.262  Assignments based on poverty are not subject 
to strict scrutiny because the assignments are not based on racial 
classifications, and they do not burden a fundamental right.263  
Thus, public school officials can exclude students from attending 
the school of their choice if the decision is intended to preserve 
the economic balance of the student body.264  If the chosen 
method falls within the government’s power, then the court will 
defer to the government’s chosen method to achieve the result.265 
Rational basis review requires the challengers to prove that 
the classification is arbitrary and does not serve the intended 
purpose.266  Under the rational basis standard, courts examine 
the relationship between the chosen classification, and whether 
the result falls within the scope of the government’s power to 
achieve that result.267  Unlike strict scrutiny, rational basis review 
does not require a perfect fit between means and ends; instead it 
requires a rough accommodation.268  Creating an educational 
 
261 See Dandridge, 397 U.S. at 483–87. 
262 Kahlenberg, supra note 242, at 1557–58. 
263 Compare Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 273–74 (1986) 
(reasoning that the government’s use of racial classifications is subject to strict 
scrutiny), with San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35 (1973) 
(noting that education “is not among the rights afforded explicit protection under 
our Federal Constitution”). 
264 See City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976) (noting that “the 
judiciary may not sit as a superlegislature to judge the wisdom or desirability of 
legislative policy determinations made in areas that neither affect fundamental 
rights nor proceed along suspect lines”). 
265 See Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 319 (1993) (explaining that the government 
does not have to prove a perfect fit between means and ends to satisfy the 
requirements of rational basis review). 
266 See id. at 320 (“Such a classification cannot run afoul of the Equal Protection 
Clause if there is a rational relationship between the disparity of treatment and 
some legitimate governmental purpose.”). 
267 See id. (explaining that courts must uphold a government classification against 
equal protection challenge if “‘there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts that 
could provide a rational basis for the classification’” (quoting Fed. Commc’ns 
Comm’n v. Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313 (1993))). 
268 See Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 55 (explaining that rational basis requires the 
government to show that a “plan is not the result of hurried, ill-conceived 
 2007] Colorblind Context 723 
environment that promotes academic success is a legitimate 
government goal.269  Under rational basis review, socioeconomic 
assignment plans should be able to survive constitutional 
scrutiny because they serve the important interests of 
eliminating the harmful effects of poverty upon public 
schoolchildren and preparing them to live and work in a 
pluralistic society.270 
Opponents to school assignment plans may argue that public 
school officials are using reduced-price and free lunch programs 
or economic status as a means for making assignments based on 
race.271  But the right to a reduced price or free lunch does not 
mean the student is an ethnic or racial minority.272  Likewise, the 
right to a reduced price or free lunch neither automatically 
creates a racially balanced nor diverse student body.273  To 
defeat a school plan that uses socioeconomic status to make 
student assignments, opponents would have to prove that the 
efforts of public school officials are unrelated to the stated 
objectives of creating an economically diverse student body.274  
For example, in Plyler v. Doe, the Court addressed whether a 
Texas law prohibiting illegal immigrant children from attending 
public schools was arbitrary and unreasonable.275 
The Supreme Court held that the State’s reasons for excluding 
these children from attending public schools or withholding 
funds for their education was unsupported by the evidence.276  
 
legislation” but a rough accommodation of interests that rationally further a 
legitimate state purpose or interest). 
269 Cf. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954) (“In these days, it is 
doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied 
the opportunity of an education.  Such an opportunity, where the state has 
undertaken to provide it, is a right which must be available to all on equal terms.”). 
270 Kahlenberg, supra note 242, at 1555. 
271 See Comfort, 418 F.3d 1, 29 (Boudin, C.J., concurring) (“The choice is 
between openly using race as a criterion or concealing it through some clumsier 
proxy device (e.g., transfer restrictions based upon family income).”). 
272 Kahlenberg, supra note 242, at 1555 (“Even opponents of using race in 
student assignment concede that using socioeconomic status is perfectly legal.” 
(footnote omitted)). 
273 See id. (explaining that although “there is clearly no better way to ensure a 
certain racial mix than by using race per se, socioeconomic integration can produce 
a substantial racial dividend”). 
274 Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 410 U.S. 356, 364–65 (1973). 
275 See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 210–30 (1982). 
276 See id. at 228–30. 
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The Court found that there was no evidence in the record to 
support the conclusion that illegal immigrant children unduly 
burdened the State’s economy.277  The Court also found that 
there was no evidence in the record to support the State’s claim 
that these children affected the quality of public school 
education.278  Finally, the Supreme Court rejected the State’s 
argument that illegal immigrant children would not remain in 
the State and use their education productively.279  Consequently, 
the Court concluded that excluding illegal immigrant children 
from attending public schools was arbitrary and unreasonable.280 
Under Plyler, public school officials would have to present 
evidence that supports the use of socioeconomic classifications 
to survive judicial scrutiny.281  Unlike the situation in Plyler, 
there is evidence to support the conclusion that the use of 
socioeconomic preferences and economic affirmative action 
creates a stable academic learning environment and reduces the 
harmful effect of poverty on public schoolchildren.282  Finally, 
the justification offered in support of “[a]ccess to equal and 
integrated schools has been an important national ethic ever 
since Brown v. Board of Education” established “‘a moral 
imperative to eradicate racial injustice in public schools.’”283 
Consistent with the principles of stare decisis and equal 
protection jurisprudence, the Court should not prohibit schools 
from using socioeconomic preferences to create student body 
diversity, even though the policy may have a discriminatory 
impact on nonminority students.284 
 
277 See id. 229–30. 
278 See id. 
279 See id. 
280 See id. at 230. 
281 See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631 (1996) (explaining that the Court will 
uphold “legislative classifications so long as [they have] a rational relationship to a 
legitimate end”). 
282 See Kahlenberg, supra note 242, at 1555–56.  See generally ACHIEVING 
DIVERSITY, supra note 241, at 62–64 (noting the effect of SES on learning and 
educational success). 
283 McFarland ex rel. McFarland v. Jefferson County Pub. Sch., 330 F. Supp. 2d 
834, 851 (W.D. Ky. 2004) (quoting Hampton v. Jefferson County Pub. Sch., 102 F. 
Supp. 2d 358, 379 (W.D. Ky. 2000)), aff’d per curiam, 416 F.3d 513 (6th Cir. 2005), 
rev’d sub nom., Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 
2738 (2007). 
284 See Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev., 429 U.S. 252, 264–68 
(1977). 
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Although the Court may have doubts about the use of 
socioeconomic factors to achieve racial diversity, the Court 
should permit public school officials to use these factors to 
eliminate racial isolation and the harmful effects of de facto 
segregation.  Consistent with his commitment to judicial 
integrity, Justice Kennedy should follow the Court’s prior 
precedent in deciding whether a state law or policy violates 
federal law.285  Thus, Justice Kennedy should join his liberal 
colleagues in holding that the use of socioeconomic preferences 
to eliminate the harmful effects of poverty is constitutionally 
permissible, even though the preferences may have a negative 
impact on nonminority students. 
Relying on Justice Kennedy’s analytical framework in Parents, 
courts should find that the use of socioeconomic factors to 
achieve a diverse student body does not violate the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment for the 
following reasons.  First, the factual assumption underlying the 
use of socioeconomic preferences is the same as the factual 
assumption underlying the Court’s public school 
jurisprudence.286  Public school officials have authority to 
formulate school policy for their school districts.287  Second, 
 
285 Although conservatives hoped that the addition of Justice Kennedy would 
overrule Roe v. Wade, Justice Kennedy joined Justices Souter and O’Connor in 
refusing to overrule the decision based upon their commitment to judicial integrity 
and social stability.  Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854–55 
(1992) (refusing to overrule Roe v. Wade because the decision clearly established 
the constitutional right of women to terminate a pregnancy within the first 
trimester; the Court’s subsequent decisions had not changed Roe’s holding; neither 
the facts nor the Court’s understanding of the facts relevant to the Court’s decision 
had changed; and, finally, society’s position on abortion had changed based on the 
Roe decision). 
286 Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738, 2791 
(Kennedy, J., concurring) (“In the administration of public schools by the state and 
local authorities it is permissible to consider the racial makeup of schools and to 
adopt general policies to encourage a diverse student body, one respect of which is 
its racial composition.” (citing Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003))); see also 
Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 25–32 (1971) (explaining 
that public school officials have authority to adopt policies that ensure each school’s 
population reflects the racial composition of the school district as a whole). 
287 See McFarland, 330 F. Supp. 2d at 850 (stating that “over many years and a 
variety of circumstances, the Supreme Court has strongly endorsed the role and 
importance of local elected school boards as they craft educational policies for their 
constituents”) (citing Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 489–90 (1992); Bd. of Educ. of 
Okla. City Pub. Sch. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 248 (1991); Washington v. Seattle Sch. 
Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457, 481–82 (1982); Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 433 U.S. 
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rational basis review is the appropriate standard for determining 
whether a school policy that does not use racial classifications is 
constitutionally permissible.288  Public education is not a 
fundamental right that triggers strict scrutiny.289  Third, the use 
of socioeconomic preferences to integrate primary and 
secondary schools is consistent with the Court’s public school 
jurisprudence.290  Although the elimination of the harmful effects 
of racial segregation and isolation is desirable, the use of 
socioeconomic preferences is consistent with the public’s 
expectation that Brown guaranteed equal educational 
opportunity for public schoolchildren regardless of race and the 
Court’s holding that student body diversity is a compelling state 
interest.291 
In short, the use of socioeconomic preferences provides state 
and local governments with the means to integrate public 
primary and secondary schools without having to satisfy strict–
and almost always deadly–scrutiny.292  Holding that public 
school officials may use socioeconomic preferences to integrate 
public and primary schools preserves the judicial integrity of the 
Court and the principles of stare decisis as the foundation for 
determining whether the Court should follow or overrule prior 
 
406, 410 (1977); Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 741–42 (1974); San Antonio 
Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 49–51 (1973)). 
288 See Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 35. 
289 See Parents, 127 S. Ct. at  2791–92 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
290 See id. at 2791 (“School districts can seek to reach Brown’s objective of equal 
educational opportunity.”). 
291 Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 426 F.3d 1162, 
1195–96 (9th Cir. 2005) (Kozinski, J., concurring) (citing Comfort v. Lynn Sch. 
Comm., 418 F.3d 1, 29 (1st Cir. 2005) (Boudin, C.J., concurring)), rev’d 127 S. Ct. 
2738 (2007). 
292 Id. at 1195 (Kozinski, J., concurring) (hoping that the Supreme Court would 
“give serious thought to bypassing strict–and almost always deadly–scrutiny and 
adopt something more akin to rational basis review”). 
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precedent.293  Thus, the Court maintains its proper role of 
interpreting the law rather than creating it.294 
B.  The Use of Socioeconomic Preferences Can Survive Strict 
Scrutiny 
Under Grutter, public school officials who use socioeconomic 
preferences to integrate primary and secondary schools may also 
consider a student’s race in deciding which students should 
attend which schools because race is only one factor used to 
make school assignments.  Although Chief Justice Roberts held 
that Grutter did not control the voluntary use of race in the 
context of public primary and secondary education, Justice 
Kennedy and the dissenting justices disagreed, relying on the 
Grutter outcome and rationale in deciding whether the 
assignment plans violated the Equal Protection Clause.295  
Traditionally, the mere fact that the government’s policies or 
practices had a discriminatory impact was insufficient to trigger 
strict scrutiny.296  Plaintiffs alleging equal protection violations 
had to prove intentional discrimination by showing facial 
discrimination, discriminatory application, or discriminatory 
motive.297  Now, the Supreme Court requires lower courts to 
 
293 Compare Parents, 127 S. Ct. at 2793 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (refusing to join 
the dissent because “the dissent’s reliance on [the] Court’s precedents to justify the 
explicit, sweeping classwide racial classifications . . . is a misreading of our 
authorities that . . . tends to undermine well-accepted principles needed to guard 
our freedom”), with Public Citizen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 470 (1989) 
(Kennedy, J., concurring) (explaining that “[a]lthough [he] believe[d] the Court’s 
result [was] quite sensible, [he could not] go along with the unhealthy process of 
amending the statute by judicial interpretation”). 
294 See, e.g., U.S. v. Nat’l Treasury Employees Union, 513 U.S. 454, 479 (1995) 
(explaining that the Court has an “obligation to avoid judicial legislation”). 
295 See Parents, 127 S. Ct. at 2792 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citing Grutter v. 
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003)); id. at 2822 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing Grutter, 
539 U.S. 306). 
296 Compare Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 73 (1971) (finding that the words of the 
statute expressly made a distinction between classes of people on the basis of 
gender), with Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 374 (1886) (holding that the law 
prohibiting the operation of laundries in wooden buildings was unconstitutional 
because the government granted exemptions only to non-Asian applicants), and 
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 252 (1976) (finding that the police department’s 
test was not unconstitutional simply because it had a disproportionate impact on 
minority applicants). 
297 See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 327–28 (explaining that strict scrutiny “is designed to 
provide a framework for carefully examining the importance and the sincerity of the 
 728 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 86, 679 
apply strict scrutiny when the plaintiff alleges that the state’s 
process or policy relies on racial classification, even though the 
policy affects whites and nonwhites equally.298 
In Johnson v. California, the Supreme Court addressed 
whether a prison policy was unconstitutional when it required 
the racial segregation of new inmates for at least a sixty-day 
period.299  The Supreme Court held that strict scrutiny applied 
whenever the government uses racial classifications or 
distinctions to make decisions.300  The Court stated that strict 
scrutiny is required because “‘there is simply no way of 
determining . . . [which decisions] are in fact motivated by 
illegitimate notions of racial inferiority or simple racial 
politics.’”301  Thus, Johnson requires the application of strict 
scrutiny “‘“to smoke out” illegitimate uses of race by assuring 
that [the] [government] is pursuing a goal important enough to 
warrant use of a highly suspect tool.’”302 
As previously stated, whether the use of race violates the 
Equal Protection Clause is a context-specific inquiry.303  In 
deciding whether a voluntary, race-conscious assignment plan 
violates the Equal Protection Clause, courts are required to 
presume that public school officials have adopted their 
educational objectives in good faith and should defer to 
judgment of public school officials that the policy is necessary to 
achieve those objectives.304  Thus, the only inquiry for review is 
whether the policy legitimately achieves those objectives subject 
to the appropriate level of judicial review.305 
 
reasons advanced by the governmental decisionmaker for the use of race in [a] 
particular context”). 
298 Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 505–09 (2005). 
299 See id. at 502. 
300 See id. at 505–09. 
301 Id. at 506 (quoting City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 
(1989)) (omission in original). 
302 Id. (quoting Richmond, 488 U.S. at 493) (second alteration in original). 
303 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 327 (2003) (“Context matters when 
reviewing race-based governmental action under the Equal Protection Clause.”). 
304 See id. at 328–29 (“[A]ttaining a diverse student body is at the heart of the 
Law School’s proper institutional mission, and [its] ‘good faith’ is ‘presumed’ absent 
‘a showing to the contrary.’” (quoting Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 
U.S. 265, 318–19 (1978))). 
305 Compare id. at 329 (“The Law School’s educational judgment that such 
diversity is essential to its educational mission is one to which [the Court] defer[].”), 
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Socioeconomic plans that consider race in deciding which 
students can attend which schools mirror the policies and 
procedures that survived strict scrutiny in Grutter.306  First, public 
school officials classify students based upon the students’ 
eligibility for free and reduced-price lunches rather than by race.  
Second, public school officials do not define diversity solely in 
terms of racial diversity.  Third, race is not outcome 
determinative and the goal is not to establish an equal balance of 
white and nonwhite students.  Finally, and most importantly, 
public school officials can eliminate the harmful effects of 
poverty upon public schoolchildren because white and nonwhite 
students receive equal consideration and treatment in deciding 
how to achieve an economically diverse student body.307 
CONCLUSION 
In Parents, the four-four-one plurality allows public school 
officials to continue their race-conscious efforts to develop 
school policies and procedures that meet our basic constitutional 
and democratic principles.  The current ideological differences 
among the current Supreme Court over the proper method for 
interpreting federal law makes “voluntary economic integration 
less risky as a legal matter”308 and meets the letter and spirit of 
Brown–that public schoolchildren, regardless of race, are 
entitled to equal access to quality education.  Although a 
majority of the current Justices agreed that the diversity-based 
benefits identified in Grutter apply to public primary and 
secondary education, the Court’s decision in Parents began a 
new era in how far the Court is willing to go in maintaining the 
legacy of Brown, which declared that in the field of public 
education separate could never be equal. 
Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito, Scalia, and Thomas 
believe that the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment prohibits the benign use of race in any context.309  
 
with id. at 388–89 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (stating that the majority’s deference 
“fails to confront the reality” that the Law School’s use of race is unconstitutional). 
306 See id. at 334, 339–42 (majority opinion). 
307 Cf. id. at 334 (explaining that the school’s diversity plan must be no broader 
than necessary to achieve its diversity goals). 
308 Kahlenberg, supra note 242, at 1554. 
309 Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738, 2791 
(2007) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“The plurality opinion is at least open to the 
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On the other side of the ideological divide, Justices Breyer, 
Ginsburg, Souter, and Stevens believe that voluntary, race-
conscious assignment plans do not violate the Equal Protection 
Clause because public school officials are not using race to 
segregate, oppress, or provide access to a limited governmental 
resource or program.310 
Justice Kennedy, as the Court’s only moderate, reasoned that 
voluntary race-conscious measures are constitutionally 
permissible to eliminate the harmful effects of racial isolation 
and de facto segregation in primary and secondary education.311  
Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion sets the foundation upon 
which future judicial decisions will rest in deciding whether 
public school assignment plans are constitutionally permissible. 
In short, his opinion provides public school officials with two 
options to achieve Brown’s vision of eliminating the harmful 
effects of racial segregation and isolation upon public 
schoolchildren.  First, public school officials can decide which 
children can attend which schools based upon socioeconomic 
preferences, even though the use of those preferences may 
prevent students from attending the schools of their choice.312  
Second, public school officials may consider a student’s race in 
deciding which children can attend which schools if race is a plus 
factor and not outcome determinative.313  Thus, like Chief 
Justice Burger’s opinion in Bakke, Justice Kennedy’s concurring 
opinion will “serve[] as the touchstone for [the] constitutional 
 
interpretation that the Constitution requires school districts to ignore the problem 
of de facto resegregation in schooling.”). 
310 See id. at 2798 n.3 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (recognizing a fundamental 
difference between the “decision to exclude a member of a minority because of his 
race” and “to include a member of a minority for that reason”). 
311 See id. at  2791 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“[Chief Justice Roberts’s] opinion is 
too dismissive of the legitimate interest government has in ensuring all people have 
equal opportunity regardless of their race.”). 
312 See City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 92 (1980) (Stevens, J., concurring). 
313 See Parents, 127 S. Ct. at 2792 (Kennedy, J., concurring).  Justice Kennedy 
stated: 
If school authorities are concerned that the student-body compositions of 
certain schools interfere with the objective of offering an equal educational 
opportunity to all of their students, they are free to devise race-conscious 
measures to address the problem in a general way and without treating 
each student in a different fashion solely on the basis of a systematic, 
individual typing by race. 
Id. 
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analysis” of efforts to end the harmful effects of de facto 
segregation.314 
 
314 Cf. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 323 (2003) (“Since [the] Court’s 
splintered decision in Bakke, Justice Powell’s opinion announcing the judgment of 
the Court has served as the touchstone for constitutional analysis of race-conscious 
admissions policy.”). 
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